Civil-society Building,
‘Advanced Liberal’ Governmentality and the State in Serbia

Marek Mikuš*

m.mikus@lse.ac.uk

The democratisation of governance in postsocialist Eastern Europe has been associated with civil-society building through international development initiatives. Anthropologists criticised it as ‘NGO-isation’ and building of a ‘project society’. This paper deals with latest stages of civil-society building in Serbia, typified by the development of ‘public advocacy’ and ‘local fundraising’. In my anthropological work-in-progress, I study such programs of the Balkan Community Initiatives Fund, a Belgrade re-granting foundation, and its grantee organizations in Serbia. These initiatives introduce ‘advanced liberal’ governmentality to Serbia which constructs relationships of civil society and ‘political society’ in a depoliticised manner consistent with the assumptions of good governance. Taking my cues from the polity approach, governmentality theory and anthropology of the state and postsocialism, I show how civil society interacts with the state in practice when being ‘developed’ in a context shaped by socialist and ethnonationalist governmentalities.

September 2011

* Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics and Political Science

---

1 Marek Mikuš is a PhD candidate at the Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics and Political Science. This paper draws on data collected in the course of the ongoing fieldwork for my doctoral research project entitled Rerunning the Transition: Democratisation, Civil-society Building and Europeanisation in Serbia. I am grateful to people in the Balkan Community Initiatives Fund and its grantee organisations, the participants in the public advocacy campaign for the protection of the City Park in Vršac, as well as all other research participants for sharing their thoughts with me and allowing me to observe their work. LSE and the International Visegrad Fund have provided funding for this research. This paper was presented at the First Oxford DGD Conference in June 2011. This has not been published anywhere else.
It has become commonplace to observe that the post-Washington Consensus development discourse is replete with buzzwords such as ‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’ (Cornwall & Brock, 2005). In the wake of almost two decades of neoliberal orthodoxy, which had diminished state developmental capacity and deepened inequalities and poverty, there were pressures to make development more democratic and pro-poor. Key global policies such as Poverty Reduction Strategies and Millennium Development Goals attest to the firmly established association between participation and poverty reduction. Increased involvement of all social groups in decision-making, the narrative goes, will bring government’s ‘transparency’, ‘accountability’ and, in effect, more of the notoriously vague ‘good governance’ (Doornbos, 2001). Significantly, the participation of ‘vibrant civil society’ in policy processes is one of the ‘crucial components in good governance’, the World Bank’s (2006, p. 12) strategy on governance and anticorruption tells us.

This paper takes cues from the calls to subject this liberal discourse, which seems to talk about what is essentially a political change without actually saying much about politics, to a political analysis (Harriss et al., 2004). Such analysis must start from unpacking basic premises of the discourse in political settings of its application. I will do so through the theoretical and empirical prisms of governmentality and anthropology in the context of recent stages of civil-society building and state reform in the (nominally) democratising and Europeanising Serbia, typified by efforts to develop ‘public advocacy’ and ‘local fundraising’. What do civil society and the state come to be in their actual practices? What ways of their relating to each other are currently being introduced? What kinds of subjectivity are required to animate the emergent relationships? What role do discursive figures such as ‘community’, ‘the local’ and ‘participation’ play in these transformations? And how is all this conditioned by the legacies of previous forms of rule? Since I argue that the ‘advanced liberal’ governmentality being introduced (Rose 1996) is locally new, I hope these paths of inquiry will also give us a hint of the future.

The relationships of the state, civil society and the self will be at the centre of my attention. Anthropologists commented that civil society was posited as the ‘bottom’ which must be empowered to balance the centralizing instinct of the state as the ‘top’ of the classical ‘vertical topography of power’. Idealised as a realm autonomous and potentially opposed to the state, it emerged as a reincarnation of the old anthropological object of fascination – the local (Ferguson, 2004). However, these visions are untenable at a time when the power of states, especially those ‘developing’ and ‘in transition’, is being complemented and subverted by governance structures traversing the nation-states, like transnational corporations and NGOs (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002). The state is also becoming increasingly NGO-like in its activities.

Anthropology conceptualises the state as a set of everyday practices and representations through which people engage with it. This involves studying the state as something which is in the same time palpable and ‘culturally constituted’ as a distinct, abstract entity (Sharma & Gupta, 2006). I will try to show how civil society interacts with the state when being ‘developed’ in a context with its own history of thinking and practicing civil society. I will argue that studying public advocacy and local fundraising necessitates going beyond (civil) society/state binaries and analysing how state and civil-society actors, as well as individuals, informal networks and companies, form (or fail to form) political alliances in order to perform governance. These processes, not devoid of transformative potential, are ridden with paradoxes inherent to the multilayered legacy of past forms of rule as well as to the advanced liberal governmentality itself.

Civil society in Eastern Europe: From ‘anti-politics’ to public advocacy
In a way, international development\(^2\) in postsocialist Eastern Europe has always been political, given that inadequacies to be rectified – ‘communist legacies’ – were themselves defined in political terms. Formerly socialist societies were expected to undergo a predictable and rapid ‘transition’ to capitalism, market economy and liberal democracy (Buyandelgeriyn, 2008). The democratisation of governance as the political aspect of this normatively and teleologically understood process was associated with ‘civil-society building’. Rather than an external imposition, the global discourse of civil society itself was revitalised by the Eastern European concept of ‘anti-politics’ (Hann, 1997, p. 28; Ferguson, 2004, p. 384). This was an invention of ‘dissidents’ like Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia or Adam Michnik in Poland who conceived of civil society as the autonomous and morally pure ‘other’ of the communist state (Eyal, 2000; Kaldor, 2003).

Curiously, the reinvented civil society came back home, to play a strategic purpose defined by mutually reinforcing ‘transitological’ (Tökés, 2000) and liberal assumptions that civil society helps consolidate and maintain democracy (Diamond, 1994; Linz & Stepan, 1996). Standard political science accounts represent postsocialist democracies as enfeebled by the weakness of civil society (Gibson, 2001; Howard, 2002, 2003). Since their understanding of civil society is heavily normative and limited to a voluntary associational realm independent of the state, they assume civil society other than the clandestinely operating dissent absent in socialism. Postsocialist citizens, this liberal argument continues, avoid participating in voluntary organizations because of their experience with the communist organizations where participation was mandatory. Informal networks of friends and kin retain their prominence which are said not to contribute to the building of an efficient, impartial state. Nationalism, in itself a part of the communist legacy (Brubaker, 1996; Verdery, 1996, pp. 85–103), is seen as another constraint on the development of civil society.

Thus, civil society must be actively supported, indeed created in the postsocialist world. I argue this intervention is still unfolding and now enters an ‘advanced liberal’ phase in Serbia. To understand the culturally and historically specific meanings and practices which shape this process, it is necessary to contextualise it within postsocialist politics and what I call the ‘genealogy of governmentalities’ in Serbia.

**Postsocialist civil society: Bringing politics back in**

Multiple layers of meaning saturate the concept of ‘civil society’ as pro-democratic force in postsocialist Europe. These older and newer, local and global discourses converged in casting civil society ‘as a homogenised and unified realm, mirroring the homogenising and unifying state to which it ostensibly stands opposed’ (Hann, 1996, p. 17). While the dissidents sought complete withdrawal from the state, the liberal view assumes that civil society must be autonomous to perform its ‘watchdog’ role and raise demands \textit{vis-à-vis} the state, thus raising its capacity for good governance (Mercier, 2002).

Houtzager (2003) argues both currently strongest intellectual trends in development – ‘neoliberal’ and ‘poststructuralist’ – invest their hopes in an independent civil society. ‘Poststructuralists’, who include some older anthropological commentators of development (Escobar, 1991, 1995), advocate radical democratic politics of localized, grassroots movements informed by traditional knowledge. However, they concur with the neoliberal approach in ‘an indiscriminate hostility toward large political organizations, be they state entities, political parties, or groups organized across many localities’ (Houtzager, 2003, p. 2, original emphasis). Their

\(^2\) The interventions on which I focus in this paper – public advocacy and local fundraising – are neither necessarily international nor classifiable as development. They could be as well a part of ‘civil-society building’ funded by the state, domestic foundations and corporate and individual donors. However, in Serbia they represent a relative novelty and at least those projects I am studying are funded by foreign governmental donors and implemented by NGO networks.
common agenda of ‘radical polycentrism’ sounds, by now, quite familiar – it envisages that administrative, political and economic decentralisation, strengthening of civil society, and popular participation in decision-making will lift masses from poverty and ‘empower’ them. Houtzager is skeptical about this scenario. The strength of civil society – its plurality – is also its weakness as it reduces negotiability of inclusive reform-oriented coalitions.

Taking cues from the polity approach, Houtzager refocuses attention on the ability of state/political and non-state/civil-society actors to engineer a ‘fit’ to produce a politics of inclusion. The bipolar readings fail to acknowledge that ‘political society’ (e.g., the state and parties) not only translate the interests of civil society organizations (CSOs)3 into a broader political arena, but often also shape their form and activities. Anthropology discovered such productive relationships in the colonial invention of ‘indigenous’ water management in Tamil Nadu (Mosse, 1997, 1999), the convergence of state and NGO rhetoric and practices on land reform in the post-apartheid South Africa (James, 2007) or the bottom-up and top-down interactions between parties, governments and Hindu nationalist organizations in the ‘Saffron Wave’ India (Blom Hansen, 1999).

The polity approach treats neither the state nor civil society as autonomous and coherent; instead, it ‘links state capacity and public policy to the capabilities and goals of nonstate actors’ (Houtzager, 2003, p. 13). The two sets of actors co-constitute a ‘polity’ in which public decision-making and action takes place. Their capacities for alliance-forging are constructed as path-dependent, i.e. evolving within institutional paths of iterative cycles of interaction and mutual adjustment, but also depending on sources of change exogenous to the polity. Thus, which actors will force an alliance depends to a considerable extent on ‘the historically changing points of access and leverage allowed by a nation’s political institutions’ (Skocpol, 1992, p. 14, quoted in Houtzager, 2003, p. 14) or opened by social change and agency of the actors.

Anthropologists tended to approach critically civil-society building in postcommunist states, including its normative presumption of the state/civil society dichotomy. Their real-world relationship reflects the legacy of ‘actually existing socialisms’. The official facade of socialist regimes consisted of formal bureaucratic systems and procedures of the party state, which were supposed to govern production, redistribution and public administration in totality. However, these seemingly monolithic structures were transformed by pervasive operations of informal networks, typically enlisting some state and party officials (Sampson, 1986; Wedel, 1986; Ledeneva, 1998). With the collapse of communism, they did not wither – to the contrary, they became key actors of the factual redistribution of wealth and power in ‘countries in transition’ (Łoś & Zybertowicz, 2000; Wedel, 2003; Ledeneva, 2006).

Organizations meeting the criteria of the liberal concept of civil society also featured in these transformations. In the 1990s, ‘flex organizations’ channeled major economic aid entering Russia (Wedel, 1998, 2000). Formally non-governmental, they were actually closely linked to the government, executing its functions without being constrained by the same rules; supposedly conducting reforms of public policy, they in fact served agendas of elite networks. Throughout Eastern Europe, government officials were busy setting up GONGOs and QUANGOs and sitting in the boards of NGOs to capture their share of aid resources (Sampson, 2002, pp. 314–313). This literature emphasises strategies of state-affiliated elites. However, I wish to demonstrate that CSOs can also profit from such alliances, for causes which both help and obstruct the democratisation of governance.

**Political society, civil society: Genealogy of governmentalities in Serbia**

---

3 I use this label, more inclusive than ‘NGOs’, to refer to the whole range of legally defined organizational forms found in civil society in Serbia and elsewhere, from informal groups through ‘associations of citizens’ to foundations.
The concept of ‘governmentality’, defined as ‘political rationality’ and the ‘conduct of conduct’, has proved useful for studying contemporary governance and development (Barry et al., 1996; Ferguson & Gupta, 2002; Watts, 2003). Since the 18th century, ‘apparatuses of security’ have been developing, associated with liberalism in the sense of governmentality rather than ideology. These technologies of rule neither approach phenomena within the forbidden/permitted binary, like the law, nor attempt to control the reality in entirety and prescribe obligatory actions to subjects, like ‘disciplines’ (Foucault, 1977). Security allows the reality to develop (laisser faire) and seeks to grasp its nature, be it desirable or not. Liberalism conditioned the emergence of the ‘population’ as a quasi-nature to be targeted by ‘normalising’ interventions, where the ‘norm’ is derived from the empirical study of population, e.g. by statistics (Foucault, 2007). Governmentality is ‘the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics’ which allow a government of the population (Foucault, 1991, p. 102).

Government shapes how individuals conduct themselves through ‘techniques of domination’, like disciplines, and ‘techniques of the self’, or processes by which individuals act upon themselves. The difference between these is one of ‘subjection’ and ‘subjectification’. Subjectification is never simply determined by subjection; rather, government is the ‘contact point’ where they interact (Burchell, 1996, pp. 19–21). Although government may condition subjectivities, its success also depends on the individuals’ will to conduct themselves in an appropriate way.

I will now review area literature and present some of my ethnographic data to situate civil society in the political context of postsocialist, postauthoritarian and post-conflict Serbia. The concept of governmentality and the insights of the polity approach will help me theorise the changing relationships between political society and civil society and their impact on current stages of civil-society building.

Contrary to the mainstream liberal assumption that civil society was completely absent in socialist states, a particular kind of civil society actually ‘thrived’ in the socialist Yugoslavia of which Serbia was a part (Stubbs, 2001, p. 93). In 1950, a decentralisation policy was introduced which also involved ‘workers’ self-management’ – the participation of workers in the management of enterprises supposedly autonomous from the state. The implementation of these policies continued in the 1960s and 1970s, leading to ‘the creation of self-management communities of interest (…) work-based, professional, service-based, and at local community level’ (Stubbs, 2007, p. 166). Apart from these organizations and veterans, youth, sports and leisure-activities associations, first feminist and ecological movements of urban intellectuals emerged in the 1980s as liberalisation advanced, particularly in Slovenia and Serbia (Vladisavljević, 2008, p. 48).

The legacy of this ‘Yugo civil society’ are organizations that the members of civil society I worked with label as ‘traditional’ or, slightly mockingly, as ‘associations of ‘beekeepers’, ‘chess players’, and ‘fishers and hunters’, to mention but a few stereotypes. These ‘traditional’ organizations have often mass memberships of groups such as the disabled or parents of mentally handicapped children whose needs and interests they are supposed to address. They channel services and goods provided by the state at a discounted or zero price to their members. I argue these organizations are predominantly products of socialist governmentality (Hindess, 1996). They often form issue-specific ‘unions’ whose national and regional bodies partially control flows of resources and govern the local organizations.4 Similar hierarchic relationships obtain inside the latter; an interviewee argued the executives have a ‘discretional right’ to decide about the members’ entitlements. Furthermore, my research participants said the ‘traditional’ organizations lack skills to ‘work in a project manner’, i.e. to apply for project funding and implement projects. Instead, they have a stable but limited access to resources distributed by national or local

---

4 This differs from ‘modern’ CSOs which either work independently from each other, or are mutually related as donors and grantees or members of ‘networks’ and ‘federations’. While donors do have a degree of power over grantees and organizations leading the network over its other members, these are all relationships of a different nature than the one between, say, a local Association of the Blind and the national Union of the Blind.
governmental bodies. In return, they practice what an interviewee called ‘politics of non-complaining’.

Organizations of disabled persons, most of them are funded by municipalities, so they have one employed person, a space, and some monthly expenses, (...) and then they won’t complain a lot (...) because they’re afraid they will lose the money.5

This evokes ‘socialist paternalism’, a political rationality which presumes a different kind of subjects than liberalism and ethnonationalism. ‘Instead of political rights or ethnocultural similarity, it posited a moral tie linking subjects with the state (...). [Subjects] were presumed to be grateful recipients – like small children in a family – of benefits their rulers decided upon for them’ (Verdery, 1996, p. 30). The subject disposition required by socialism – dependency – determines how these ‘Yugo CSOs’ relate to political society, while they in turn require it from their members. Working largely like formally independent para-governmental agencies, they are a legacy of Yugoslavia’s peculiar, ‘selectively repressive’ authoritarianism (Vladisavljević, 2008, pp. 41–49) which marked it off the more purist Soviet Bloc regimes. However, since Yugoslavia was still primarily a communist party-state, self-management and relatively relaxed cultural policies yielded a developed but dependent ‘Yugo civil society’.

These organizations face an uncertain future. There is a dearth of relevant data, but some general trends can be ascertained. State reforms toward a greater ‘efficiency’ and ‘transparency’, instigated by international actors including the EU, as well as budgetary constraints exacerbated by the world capitalist crisis, have likely limited their access to public funds and will certainly do so in the future. Unable to fundraise from other sources, many are either reduced to surviving or forced to ‘develop their capacities’. However, at present they represent competition to ‘modern’ organizations working on the same issues – for resources, but also for memberships which give them more legitimacy than the latter enjoy.

While the ‘traditional’ CSOs never disappeared, new ones have been developing in the 1990s as in opposition to the ‘competitive authoritarian’ regime of Slobodan Milošević (Gould & Sickner, 2008; Vladisavljević, 2010) which presided over large-scale social and economic transformations. The party-state elites maintained, even more successfully than elsewhere in postsocialist Europe, their ‘interlocked positions of economic and political dominance in order to postpone the development of a market economy and political competition’ (Lazić, 2000, p. 130). As war economy and economic sanctions were crippling the official sector, a huge informal sector developed in which the increasingly criminalised regime and its allied elites directly participated (Sörensen, 2003; Andreas, 2005).

Though antagonistic to the state, the new CSOs did have significant links, shaped by political culture and political economy, to some political organizations, especially opposition parties. The folk theory of ‘two Serbias’6 provided a culturally grounded account of the fact that civil society’s political links were almost exclusively with the opposition. Essentially a narrative about the assaults on the achievements of urbanisation and modernisation in the post-Yugoslav period (Jansen, 2005), it can be on another level read as a Serbian variation on the ‘anti-politics’ theme. Since 1992, the

---

5 This and all other translations from Serbian are mine.

6 Although some scholars (Gordy, 1999) took it for an adequate description of reality, I argue it is better understood as a folk theory. As such, it captures something of social reality, but I agree with many of my research participants on that it oversimplifies in doing so. The binary of ‘two Serbias’ reflects widespread folk models of politics, culture and society which draw links, on the one hand, between political orientations and socio-cultural classifications. Thus, they associate conservative and nationalist views with ‘peasants’, ‘peasant-urbanites’ and the like groups, whereas the cultured urban middle class is seen as inherently cosmopolitan, liberal and ‘civil’ (Jansen, 2001, 2005; Greenberg, 2006a). Significantly, the adjective gradanski/čpahanski, derived from grad/grad (‘city’), translates as ‘urban’ as well as ‘civil’. The ‘First Serbia’ can be said to be ‘Balkanised’ by this folk theory. Balkanism is a discourse similar to Orientalism which locates the Balkans to the periphery of the symbolic geography of Europe and the bottom of its civilizational hierarchy, but is also often mobilised to establish such hierarchies between and within Balkan countries, nations and social categories (Bakić-Hayden & Hayden, 1992; Bakić-Hayden, 1995; Živković, 2001).
opposition, operating largely through CSOs, was identifying itself as the ‘Other Serbia’ of urban intellectuals, artists and professionals. This identification was in contrast to the ‘First Serbia’ of rural and semi-urban groups and the regime which they supported (Naumović, 2002, p. 25–26; Bieber, 2003a, p. 19). Employing this ideological self-conception analytically risks overlooking that a strong ‘illiberal’ (nationalist and authoritarian) sector of civil society\(^7\) had assisted Milošević in his rise to power in late 1980s (Dragović-Soso, 2002; Vladislavljević, 2008) and nurtured links with political society under Milošević (Bieber 2003a) and after (Byford, 2002, 2003; Kostovicova, 2006). However, as this is not my focus here, I will go on to use the term ‘civil society’ in its normative meaning which, in Serbia, has become almost synonymous with civil society as such.

Thus, under Milošević, CSOs cooperated with those parties which gravitated toward liberal democracy, although rarely unambiguously (Bieber, 2003b; Stojanović, 2010, p. 161-211), to achieve the shared goal of regime change. Schematically speaking, they supported the opposition by mobilizing citizens; collecting and providing information on public opinion; monitoring elections; assisting in programme formulation; insisting on the unity of the chronically fragmented opposition (Bieber, 2003b). All these strategies were employed in the run-up to the regime change in October 2000 (Paunović et al., 2001).

The regime’s response was to repress civil society by communist-style methods: spying, infiltration, threats, posing bureaucratic barriers, and arresting the activists, especially in the last few years of its ascendancy (Stojiljković, 2006, pp. 322-334). CSOs except some ‘traditional’ and ‘illiberal’ organizations are believed not to have had an access to the state, its resources and decision-making, apart from those municipalities where the opposition came to power in 1996.

The regime also used its strong grip on the nation-wide media (almost all electronic and most print) (Gordy, 1999, pp. 60–101; Pavlaković, 2005, p. 23) to wage a denigration campaign against civil society, especially human rights groups. They were presented as ‘enemies of the Serbian nation’ and ‘foreign-paid mercenaries’ (Collin, 2001, pp. 122–125). While the regime attempted to maintain the principle of socialist paternalism in some domains, its ‘policy’ on civil society was clearly based on ethnonationalist political rationality. Postcommunist ‘national socialism’ (Vujačić, 2003) was enabled by collectivism underpinning both forms of rule. While liberalism postulates the society as a community of autonomous individuals, socialism and ethnonationalism posit a socialist or ethnic nation whose collective interests the state represents. In the 1990s, homogenised postsocialist societies around Eastern Europe easily lent themselves to ethnicisation and hostility toward ‘others’ (Verdery, 1998; Hann, 1999). Purporting to represent the collective interests of the Serbian nation, Milošević logically strived to brand civil society as ‘anti-Serbs’ – political and therefore, by implication, ethnic others. The 2000 regime change, while not a clear break with such governmentality, was certainly an important step toward its marginalisation.

However, antagonism against civil society persists in a large part of the population. That many, including nationalist or conservative intellectuals, reproduce this subject position may hint at the individual-level techniques required by a successful government. This subjectivity contradicts the new governmentality being introduced in and through civil society, and its members I interviewed and observed were well aware of it. They often referred to the results of public opinion polls showing that civil society enjoys very low trust (CeSID, 2005; unpublished USAID research) and bitterly complained that many people see them as ‘foreign-paid mercenaries’ and ‘thieves’. Some claimed that human rights activists working since the 1990s occupy the centre stage with their overly ‘politicised’ statements and are thus also responsible for perpetuating the bad image of civil society. To establish a relationship of trust, some CSOs present themselves to people not as a ‘non-governmental organization’ (nevladina organizacija; невладина организация), which assumed a decidedly negative connotation of an ‘anti-Serb’ human rights group, but rather as an

---

\(^7\) In this instance, I am using the term civil society in its anthropological sense which is more inclusive and empirical rather than normative. See Hann & Dunn, 1996; Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999; Hann, 2003.
‘association of citizens’ (udruženje građana; удрожение грађана), a term associated with the ‘traditional’, widely familiar organizations seen as apolitical.

The ‘October revolution’ of 2000 was variously interpreted as an ‘electoral revolution’ using know-how from similar transitions in Slovakia and Croatia (Bunce & Wolchik, 2007; Kalandadze & Orenstein, 2009), ‘unfinished’ popular revolution (Pavičević, 2010) or negotiated settlement prompted by a ‘switch’ of elite political allegiance (Gagnon, 2004, p. 128; Gould & Sickner, 2008). These debates cannot be reviewed here, but it seems uncontroversial to say that most mainstream and popular accounts do attribute a significant political role to civil society. However, controversies surround the nature of its engagement. These can be well illustrated by the example of Otpor (Omnop, Resistance), the most visible and numerous CSO or, more accurately, a movement (Ilić, 2001). While the probably more mainstream view holds that it was a genuinely popular and indigenous movement (Golubović, 2007, 2008), Slobodan Naumović (2006, 2007), while not rejecting this aspect altogether, emphasises the extent of its personal, organizational and financial links with opposition parties and foreign, especially US, governmental, para-governmental and non-governmental bodies.

As previous remarks suggest, political economy significantly shaped the political role of civil society. Civil society was booming in the last few years of Milošević’s rule when robust international aid for the opposition forces was flowing to the country. For instance, the US government reportedly increased its funding from $18 mil. in 1998 to $53 mil. in 1999 (Naumović, 2006, p. 165). From mid-1999 to late 2000 alone, US private and public agencies spent about $40 mil. USD on ‘democracy programs’ and European actors probably a similar amount (Carothers, 2001). CSOs were cropping up especially in those municipalities where the opposition came to power in the 1997 local elections (NGO Policy Group, 2001, p. 18). As German foundations (Stiftungen) are forbidden from providing overt financial and material assistance to foreign parties (Spoerri, 2010, p. 1111) and the funding to opposition political parties in Serbia was technically illegal at the time (Vetta, 2009, p. 29), CSOs were main recipients of aid resources for democratisation. My interviewees also commented that the late 1990s and early 2000s are remembered as a period when funding for CSOs was abundant and easy to get.

Civil society went through major changes in the post-Milošević period. The annual increase in the number of NGOs peaked in 2001, following which it started to decline (Milivojević, 2006, p. 46). The relationships of political society and civil society became more generic in at least two different respects. Firstly, the state and civil society were taking first steps toward establishing formal channels of cooperation as the good governance and New Public Management discourses envisage it (ibid.; Vetta, 2009; Lončar, 2010). However, reformist forces faced the classical problem of negotiated transitions – high degree of continuity in bureaucratic personnel and practices (Jensen, 2001) which brakes the development of partnerships. Given that IFIs, the EU and various non- and para-governmental Western agencies are main promoters of these principles, it is not surprising that at the forefront of such developments have often been public institutions most involved in implementing foreign-funded programs, such as the Office for the EU Integration and the Team for Social Inclusion and Poverty Reduction. The government’s newly founded Office for Cooperation with Civil Society, according to the director Ivana Ćirković who switched from the Team, is charged with developing ‘clear’ and ‘transparent’ mechanisms of cooperation. As I show below, public advocacy initiatives represent examples of such approach but their implementation may equally incorporate informal links.

Interestingly, while the Team is organizationally a part of The Office of the Deputy Prime Minister for European Integration, it is actually a foreign-funded project itself. It was first established in 2003 to implement the World Bank-funded Poverty Reduction Strategy. Since 2008, it has been implementing the project Contact Civil-Society Organizations for the Implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy in the Republic of Serbia in order to include a select group of CSOs in the Strategy implementation and develop their dialogue with the state. In 2009, its mandate was reformulated to bring it more in line with the EU concept of social inclusion. It is currently funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.
Another change has been that civil society can be now found to have informal and personal links with the state as well as with parties, in line with the anthropological observations of the postsocialist civil society. Even the apparently formal cooperation of ‘the government and a few big organizations, based predominantly in Belgrade’, relies on personal links (Lončar, 2010, p. 124–125). Many former activists joined the new political establishment, including some notorious members of Otpor. A number of individuals, including some participating in my research, moves between civil sector and institutionalised politics.

My research participants, both during interviews and daily work, often mentioned what they sometimes called ‘partisan NGOs’ or ‘governmental NGOs’ (vladine nevladine; владине невладине). These are founded by individuals more or less directly linked to government officials for the primary purpose of accessing governmental funds earmarked for CSOs, often but not exclusively at the municipality level. They are believed to mushroom especially since the new law on associations came to force in October 2009 which simplified the founding of CSOs and permitted their engagement in profit-making activities. While CSOs which are not so well politically connected have to apply for project funding in a formal competition, these organizations are believed to get money without applying or in a mock competition and enjoy a considerable discretion in their spending:

Q. [the city where the interviewee’s NGO is based] has an open competition each year for money for NGOs, and when we see the results (…) all of a sudden something shows up which is called The Youth Committee of the City of Q., a youth organization, and we’re working with the youth and we’ve never heard of it. And when you google them, they don’t exist. Not at all. Then there is (…), which was founded, literally in the Management Committee there are members of [a party in the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina], and they are getting fabulous money from the city, so not in a competition, but out of a competition, for some social services like (…) helping the elderly, but they don’t use the money to give the help, but to collect money from the citizens to distribute to elderly households.

The glue of these networks, my participants argued, are typically links within and around one of the incumbent parties in the municipality. Some claimed this is most often the Democratic Party whose members and supporters, given its history and social base, have most capacities for running NGOs. Informal and partisan links thus emerge as civil society’s key ‘points of access’ to the state, path-dependent on postsocialist transformations but possibly also developments in the Serbian polity going as far back as the 19th century (Stojanović, 2010, pp. 25–58).

NGO-isation, phase two: ‘Advanced liberal’ governmentality in Serbia

In postsocialist South East Europe, development agencies sought to replace the legacy of ‘Yugo civil society’ and the undesirable local models of civility based on kinship, friendship or religion (Hann, 2003) with their own ‘magical’ concept of civil society (Hann 1996). Anthropologists argued these interventions created a ‘project society’ rather than the decentralised participative channels envisaged by ‘neoliberals’, save the spontaneous grassroots movements of ‘poststructuralists’. Project society is a donor-driven social structure and practice defined by the shared interests, vocabulary and values of local civil-society elites and international agencies engaged in a complex web of resource flows (Sampson, 1996, 2002, 2004). It arguably constitutes a transnational ‘elite culture’ (Shore & Nugent, 2002). Importantly, project society is accountable to donors rather than beneficiaries.

Running through this literature is the charge that civil-society building leads to ‘NGO-isation’ (Stubbs, 2007) by privileging formal, stable, structured organisations over informal, loose and fluctuating networks and movements (Nuijten, 2001). Indeed, all the trainings, seminars and study trips, summarily referred to as ‘capacity building’, aim at qualitative changes such as ‘transparency’, ‘sustainability’ or ‘autonomy’ of organisations (Sampson, 1996, p. 129). Donors define professional standards of practice and through constant tutoring, monitoring, evaluating,
rewarding and sanctioning, they help the grantee organisations meet them. A particular kind of civil society ‘has become a development project in itself’ (Vetta, 2009, p. 27, original emphasis).

Such analysis is applicable to Serbian CSOs which were forced to rely almost exclusively on foreign donors. This produces a subjectivity of dependency which is different from the one induced by socialist paternalism but also problematic from the perspective of advanced liberal governmentality currently being channelled through civil society. I will draw on my ethnographic material to describe and analyse this governmentality and its interactions with legacies of past governmentalties.

International actors funding governance reforms in Serbia understand the role of civil society broadly in line with the good governance and New Public Management discourses. For instance, in 2001–2007 USAID implemented the Community Revitalization through Democratic Action program worth $200 mil. Its aim was to increase citizens’ democratic participation in decision-making by supporting their active involvement in community-level associations (Vetta, 2009, p. 40-45). These associations, founded by the project, were conceptualised as strictly ‘apolitical’ and ‘autonomous’. Under Assistance Objective 2, Democratic Structures Strengthened, the USAID 2011–2015 strategy for Serbia envisages activities to strengthen ‘civil society organizations so they can better represent their constituents [and] serve as effective watchdogs’ (USAID, 2011, p. 3). This includes support for ‘advocacy campaigns’, ‘public-private partnerships’ and ‘corporate social responsibility’ (ibid.). The EU’s 2010–2011 Enlargement Strategy also pledges to ‘strengthen capacities’ of CSOs, including ‘local community-based organisations’, ‘to engage in an effective dialogue with public and private actors and to monitor developments in areas such as the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights’ (EC, 2010, p. 14).

Since 2006, USAID’s support to civil society in Serbia under Assistance Objective 2 is channeled through a branch of the US Institute for Sustainable Communities (ISC). Balkan Community Initiatives Fund (BCIF), the largest indigenous grantmaking and ‘re-granting’ foundation in Serbia and one of the ISC’s strategic partners, is running its own Public Advocacy in Local Communities (PALC) program since 2005. The 2009–2010 project cycle was funded by DfID and the ongoing 2010–11 cycle by USAID via ISC. The program aims to encourage organizations to develop initiatives which will draw the community’s attention to a serious problem or subject in the local community, include the citizens in an active solving of the problem, and direct decision-makers toward choosing the adequate solution.\(^9\)

BCIF typically opens one call for proposals a year and chooses a group of about ten CSOs. It then trains them in public advocacy as a fixed technique to help them develop and eventually implement their project concepts. Finally, it provides a local-currency equivalent of up to €12,000 for projects approved by the Selection Committee with representatives of BCIF and ISC. I take my ethnographic data from pre-implementation practices (such as trainings) within the 2010–2011 cycle and from the implementation of an advocacy campaign within the 2009–2010 cycle, as well as from interviews and informal conversation with the participants.

Further data are taken from the BCIF’s Philanthropy Program which involves a rather broad set of activities. For those aimed at assistance to other CSOs, BCIF’s starting premise is that Serbian civil society is still largely dependent on foreign donors who are currently leaving the country or will do so in the near future.\(^10\) Therefore, BCIF helps CSOs ‘achieve financial

---


\(^10\) For instance, DfID has closed its Serbian office in late 2010 and USAID is unofficially expected to leave in 2015. European funds are increasingly available, but given the volume of donations and very demanding financial governance and reporting, these are only deemed accessible to larger, well-established CSOs with developed administrative capacities.
sustainability, i.e. establish cooperation with a broader circle of donors in the local community', including both citizens and companies. BCIF closely cooperates and uses experiences of the Czech VIA Foundation which provided a similar assistance to Czech NGOs. I observed practices and interviewed participants in the 2010–2011 Fundraising from Local Sources project implemented with the VIA Foundation and funded by the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as in the ongoing 2011–2012 Successful Fundraising project funded by USAID via ISC. Both projects share the same basic principles: BCIF provides training to the CSOs to improve their fundraising capacities and help them develop their fundraising plans; those whose plans are good enough get support to go on with their fundraising campaigns; in the end, the groups get a ‘matching donation’ of up to €3,500 in the first case and $5,000 in the second.12

I will now analyse key elements of public advocacy and local fundraising as domains of discourse and practice. First, the quoted project descriptions and other textual data and social interactions I studied suggest that ‘the (local) community’ is the end beneficiary.13 In public advocacy, the community must be ‘included’ in the campaign which addresses its own interest, indeed it must ‘actively participate’ in it. In local fundraising, it is the source of funding for services which, in turn, the CSO should provide to it. As we will see, these entails ethical responsibilities of CSOs toward ‘their’ communities.

Second, ‘the state’ (or ‘decision-makers’, ‘politicians’ etc.) in public advocacy and ‘donors’ or ‘philanthropists’ (corporate and individual) in local fundraising are constructed as quasi-natural domains which work according to their own rules and principles. In their own interest, CSOs should understand the principles to be able to successfully engage with these domains – achieve a policy change with the state, raise funds and meet commitments with the donors. In effect, what the ‘population’ is to liberal governmentality working though the state, the state and the donors are to advanced liberal governmentality channelled through civil society.

Fundraising trainings are typically opened with the standard pragmatic argument of the need for local fundraising development – big donors are leaving Serbia, we simply need to accept this and get ready. Accordingly, the trainers teach the participants about the donors’ possibilities and motivations for giving and seek to improve marketing and communication skills of the participants to meet the donors’ expectations. For instance, the donors like to be addressed in a ‘normal, clear, human’ language. In promotional materials, they prefer to see photos and stories of ‘concrete people’ rather than ‘boring, bureaucratic’ text. The participants may be also told that if they are working on ‘controversial topics’, such as drug addiction or home violence, ‘there’s a very small chance you’ll get money from companies’. To give the participants a first-hand knowledge of the donors, people such as CSR managers get invited to the trainings.

Similarly, in public-advocacy trainings I attended, the focus was on learning to ‘read the budget’, on understanding its structure, terminology and process of its adoption to be able to talk to decision-makers in an informed, persuasive manner. In one of the seminars, the Director of the Budget Department of a Municipality Administration in the Sandžak region gave an insider-view talk about the political process of budget adoption. Skills necessary for an appropriate


12 For instance, if an organization participating in the second project collects $3,000, it will receive another $3,000 from BCIF; if it raises more than $5,000, it can only get the maximum matching donation of $5,000.

13 Many projects address needs and interests of what I call localised ‘communities of identity’, i.e. not of the whole geographically defined population, but of its subset which is typically marginalised or disadvantaged – women, Roma, the disabled and so on.

14 The campaigns in the 2010–11 PALC project cycle are supposed to aim at changes in the spending of municipality budgets. These changes should be defined in formal decisions of the municipality governments.
communication with decision-makers – brief, emphatic and emotionally effective – were also practiced.

Third, the requirement of CSOs independence from the state and foreign donors was repeatedly emphasised in the trainings. Thus, being financially dependent on the state may ‘compromise your independence’, which is why you should strive for a ‘healthy fundraising mix’. Public advocacy, as the PALC program manager told me, ‘always demands an opponent’, usually the municipality government from which the advocacy campaign demands an adoption of a formal decision. Only CSOs autonomous from the governmental body are deemed capable of doing this. Therefore, the seminar participants were told that politicians or parties cannot be enrolled to the networks for advocacy campaigns, neither can they be considered ‘key partners’. The network should ‘exert pressure’ on politicians, not ‘work with’ them. This requirement of autonomy was closely associated with the watchdog role that civil society should play. Thus, one of the CSOs intended not only to demand an allocation of budget funds for a gender equality policy, but also to follow how the earmarked money are being spent. It is here where advanced liberal governmentality adopts a rather moral tone. For instance, the Budget Department director mentioned that she noticed that some organizations in the seminar aim to ‘enter the budget’ (da udu na budžetu; da yby na budżetu), i.e. to become permanent budget beneficiaries who receive money without having to apply for project funding. However, the director commented, that is not right; after all, they CSOs demand an efficient use of public resources, so they must be the examples: ‘When we will reach the stage of using resources efficiently and transparently, all organisations will have to compete for concrete projects.’

Fourth, there was a tension between this emphasis on autonomy and other techniques which, stemming from the naturalisation of political society, could be interpreted as amounting to a rapprochement with the latter. Teaching the participants knowledge and skills necessary for efficient communication with decision-makers falls into this category. This is illustrated by a story which the Budget Department director told about an occasion when she informally helped an NGO to get support from the mayor. She provided the following meta-commentary: ‘Sometimes you literally have to play by their rules, but if it helps you reach a good goal…’ Indeed, while informality within political society was construed by the PALC participants as immoral, informality on the part of civil society – in ‘moderate’ forms, such as skillful use of appropriate communication tactics – is legitimised by serving the right purposes. Similarly, politicians were construed as always pursuing their own interests, but that may be accepted if they help you reach the campaign goals.

Finally, the need for the CSOs to professionalise was reiterated. The Philanthropy Program requires and teaches the participating CSOs to develop ‘strategic plans’ before they can begin the fundraising campaign. BCIF staff as well as participants considered this very important since most organizations in Serbia only ‘live from a project to a project’ without ever making long-term, strategic plans of their funding and activities. This is where the governmentality requires specific techniques of the self and again adopts a moral quality. Strategic plans should be ‘mission-driven’, ‘based on values’ of the organization, not ‘donor-driven’. Only donors who will not compromise your mission should be chosen, e.g. ecological organizations should not accept money from heavy polluters and none from companies and individuals perceived as corrupt. In relation to both donors and beneficiaries, transparent and frugal use of funds, strictly for previously agreed purposes, is of essence.

As indicated, the discourses and practices of public advocacy and local fundraising pose multiple paradoxes. These are immanent to advanced liberal rule but also result from its interaction with the legacies of past governmentalities in Serbia. Arising from the criticism of the welfare state, advanced liberal governmentality seeks to govern through the regulated choices of individual citizens, now construed as subjects of choices and aspirations to self-actualization and self-fulfillment. Individuals are to be governed through their freedom (…) as
members of heterogenous communities of allegiance, as “community” emerges as a new way of conceptualizing and administering moral relations amongst persons (Rose, 1996, p. 41).

Both classical and ‘advanced’ (or neo-) liberalism specify individuals simultaneously as the objects of governmental action and the voluntary partners of government (Burchell, 1996, p. 23). However, while early liberalism analysed by Foucault viewed the individual’s freedom as natural and thus naturally necessitating limits to governmental power, neoliberalism makes a shift to a certain constructivism. Far from abolishing governmental action altogether, it redirects it to actively promote the autonomisation of individuals and society, their constitution as self-governing subjects driven by market rationality. This is a paradoxical strategy of using subtle constraints, controls and incentives to produce an apparent freedom and autonomy. Thus, public advocacy and local fundraising require the NGOs to stick to their mission and values and to be oriented to the ‘community’, but do so by specifying their own requirements of professionalism, transparency and the like which the CSOs are expected to fulfill, and devising mechanisms for rewarding those who succeed. Moreover, they continue to hold them accountable to donors who can never be simply equated with the ‘community’ and some of which actually transcend it.

I argue that the artificial, purposeful nature of such processes is laid bare even more clearly in a context permeated by the legacies of radically different governmentalities of the recent past. On the one hand, many CSOs which are now to become autonomous and oriented to their beneficiaries were molded as dependents and extensions of the paternalist socialist state. Even more have come to exist as clients and conduits of foreign donors within the political economy of ‘project society’ and the political culture of ‘two Serbias’. They all now face either a gradual demise or an uneasy adaptation to new conditions, which involves adopting the new techniques of the self.\footnote{There is a growing perception of organizations overly reliant on international donors as somewhat ‘old-fashioned’. For instance, one such Belgrade NGO was described to me as ‘working like it was still ’92 and they’re the same alternative civil society taking money from Soros and perhaps a few more foreign donors.’}

On the other hand, many individuals who are now to become donors and beneficiaries of the CSOs construed as channels of ‘community’ self-regulation have internalised collectivist subject positions which define them as members of socialist or ethnic nation (Greenberg 2006b, 2007, p. 356–369) rather than members of ‘communities’, let alone private philanthropists and community activists. This is also linked to the distrust of NGOs as enemies of the Serbian nation or representatives of particular interests. Furthermore, citizens have an experience with the primarily socialist but still persisting practice of collecting mandatory ‘contributions’ (\textit{samodoprinosi}; \textit{самодоприноси}) for various projects by national and local authorities. However, I have yet to ascertain the impact of this practice on individual philanthropy today.

Another tension is provoked by the tendency of advanced liberal rule as well as the cognate discourses of good governance and New Public Management to depoliticise governance by subjecting it to apparently neutral and technical techniques of scrutiny, such as budget disciplines, accountancy and audit, and market principles of efficiency, competition and flexibility. Civil society is then invited to become a voluntary ‘partner’ of such benevolent, apolitical government as well as its competitor in the provision of public services. While this apparent depoliticisation is itself always political, in Serbia its propositions resonate as particularly naive. Although there are first signs of reform in this direction, the popular and expert opinions agree that political institutions remain unrepresentative, public administration heavily politicised and both corrupt. Formal channels of cooperation develop slowly and with difficulties whereas the informal links of some CSOs with political society are seen by others as illegitimate. The legacy of the ‘Other Serbia’ subjectivity may lead to the perception of ‘partnership’ with the state as, at the minimum, ethically risky. Most civil-society members doubt they could be actors of political transformations (Lončar, 2010, p. 127). In the register of the polity approach, institutional paths of development had been such as to restrict access points to informal links or dependency \textit{vis-à-vis} political society, and exogenous transformations have only started to open new access points. It is therefore likely that in
relation to the state, for many the choice appears to be one between complete cooptation or continued antagonism. According to the PALC program manager, the tension comes through in the seminars when the participants practice communication with decision-makers:

Either it’s like – I’m small and submissive, or it’s like – what you wanna, man, I’m taking it head on, I’m strong, bla bla bla. And those are the two extremes of civil society in Serbia. Either I’m very loud, I’m very… taking it head on, taking it very rough, or I’m totally pitiful, small.

To get around this tension, participants in public advocacy, as a site where political society and civil society inevitably interact, emphasised the principal difference between the two. Public advocacy is thus one of the domains in which the ‘cultural constitution’ of the Serbian state takes place and where its everyday and localised practices and representations are attributed meanings which construct the state as a distinct and translocal entity. Although enmeshed in the participants’ daily lives, the state’s semblance of the ‘other’ can be maintained. Institutions were thus often construed as inefficient, inert and corrupt, and politicians as self-interested, superficial and shamefully ignorant. Furthermore, relationships to the state were conceptualised as formal – politicians cannot be a part of the campaign network; the campaigns aim for a formal decision; they should refer to relevant laws and policy documents such as local strategies and action plans. Even when a degree of informality in the interactions was envisaged, it was restricted to communication tactics and legitimated by the right purpose.

**Case study: Public advocacy campaign for the protection of the City Park in Vršac**

I will now draw on a case study of a public advocacy campaign within the PALC 2009–2010 project cycle to further develop my analysis. The campaign focused on the protection and care of the City Park in Vršac, a subregional centre in the Banat region of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. It is one of the most beautiful and oldest public parks in Serbia; historically, parks and gardens tended to be established rather as a part of aristocratic mansions, i.e. as quasi-private rather than public. The City Park has been gradually assuming its present character since the 18th century, culminating in a burst of activity in the late 19th century mostly driven by the large German community in Vršac. It combines elements of the formal and symmetrical French garden with the freer English-style landscaping. It features a wide variety of plant species, mostly deciduous trees, and historical architectural elements from the 19th and early 20th centuries (greenhouse, fencing, fountain, musical pavilion, exhibition pavilion, water tower, and wooden building of a cake shop, now serving as a restaurant). As such, it is an important natural and cultural heritage site and a reminder of the multicultural history and past wealth of Vršac (Gradanski parlament, 2010; PZZP, 2011). By far the largest public park or garden in Vršac, it is also functionally and emotionally very important to its residents.

The park was first put under protection as a ‘natural monument of garden architecture’ (prirodnii spomenik vrtnoe arhitekturii) by the 1973 act of the Assembly of the Municipality of Vršac, in the then socialist Yugoslavia, which remains in force at the time of writing. The act banned any works which might alter the appearance of the park or threaten its future existence and it put the Park ‘under the authority and use’ of the Tourist Transport and Service Company Drugi oktobar (Šaobraćajno-turističko i uslužno preduzeće “Drugi oktobar”) (PZZP, 2011, annex 2). The company thus became, vis-à-vis the park, what the present law, but also people involved in the campaign, refer to as a ‘custodial institution’ (staralac; staralač) or the ‘managing institution’ (upravljač; управљач). The 1973 act requires the company to develop ‘a plan of maintenance i.e. regulation’ (plan održavanja odnosno uredjenja) and only carry out works previously approved by the Institute for Nature Conservation of Vojvodina Province and, in some cases, by the municipal government (ibid.; Gradanski parlament, 2010, p. 19). The first attempt to amend this regulatory framework was made in 2000 when another state body, the Institute for Nature Conservation of
Serbia,

revised the protection status in accordance with the 1991 Law on Environment Protection and its six amendments from 1992–1995. The draft act was sent to the municipality, but it has never been adopted (PZZP, 2011, preface). Drugi oktobar thus remains the custodian. It is now formally an ‘enterprise in social ownership for communal undertakings’ (preduzeće u društvenoj svojini za komunalne delatnosti; предузеће у друштвеној својини за комуналне делатности), meaning it is supposedly owned by the employees and provides public services to residents, such as sanitation, waste management, potable water, gas distribution, but also greenery maintenance.

The interviewed campaign participants agreed that despite the park’s protected status, its condition has been continually worsening. Most significantly, many tree specimen have been lost due to biological aging, but also inadequate care; the lost trunks might have numbered as many as two hundred over past five years (Gradanski parlament, 2010, p. 37). Some of the old architectural elements were damaged or even destroyed altogether. In the socialist period, the original gravel paths were asphalted, probably without the approval of the Province Institute. The former exhibition pavilion currently serves as a disco, which the campaign participants saw as an inappropriate kind of use contributing to the night-time acts of vandalism in the park.

The park’s deterioration prompted a network of individuals and CSOs from Vršac to initiate a campaign demanding that adequate protection measures are carried out. The project was formally implemented by a Vršac NGO called Citizens’ Parliament ‘Free’ City of Vršac, usually only referred to as Gradanski parlament. The organisation is led by President Virdžinija Marina, a former theatre director and journalist. While she was acting as the ‘project manager’ and its public face, a number of other people were engaged, often purely informally, as collaborators (some of whom have received renumeration from the project budget\(^17\)) or simply allies; I will discuss below the key role they played. The campaign ran under the title This is My Place.\(^18\) Two ‘specific goals’ of the campaign were originally defined in the project draft submitted to BCIF:

1) So that the members of the Assembly of the Municipality of Vršac adopt, by the end of 2010, an act on the Protection of the City Park based on the proposal contained in the City Park Protection Study based on the draft made in 2002 by the Institute for Nature Conservation

2) The drafting and adoption of a mid-term (2011–2015) and annual park management plan[s] which should be done by the custodial institution (drafting) and the Municipality Council (adoption).

The somewhat confusing formulation in the first paragraph seems to refer to the mentioned protection status revision carried out, according to the most recent ‘protection study’ (studija zaštite; студија заштите) of the Province Institute (PZZP, 2011), by the Serbia Institute in 2000 rather than 2002. In Serbia, the term ‘protection study’ refers to documents which are produced by either of the two state conservation institutes and contain, most importantly, a description of the area or object to be protected and proposed protection measures. The protection study serves as a basis for the ‘draft act on the establishment of a protected area’ (predlog akta o proglašenju zaštićenog područja; предлог акта о проглашењу заштићеног подручја). Following a public consultation process, the act must then be adopted by the relevant government body according to the chosen level of protection.

The 2000 revision envisaged the third, i.e. lowest level of protection for the park, and the act was therefore to be adopted by the Assembly of the Municipality of Vršac. The campaign originally

\(^16\) At that point, this was a single state body of that type. The Institute for Nature Conservation of Vojvodina Province was re-established in 2010.

\(^17\) According to the project budget submitted to BCIF, all salaries or payments for particular services were planned at less than an equivalent of €100, except the salaries of the project manager and her assistant and the costs of designing and printing the promotional materials.

\(^18\) In the campaign’s materials, its title was rendered in five languages (Serbian, Romanian, Hungarian, German and English, in this order) to evoke the multicultural character of Vršac that the park symbolises. This fits with Virdžinija Marina’s interest in issues such as multiculturalism, cross-border cultural cooperation and minority rights. Virdžinija comes from the significant Romanian minority of the Banat region.
only demanded that such an act, some ten years later, is finally adopted and that it appoints a new custodial institution for the park if the present one is deemed unable or unwilling to implement the prescribed protection measures (Gradanski parlament, 2010, p. 38). That still seemed to be the objective at the roundtable organised by Gradanski parlament in October 2010 and attended by representatives of local self-government, the Province Institute, the advocacy campaign, Drugi oktobar, the Varoš Public Enterprise, 19 civil society and the media. The attending representatives of the Province Institute pledged to update the 2000 study and align it with the 2009 Law on Nature Protection and its 2010 amendment; the Municipal Assembly would then declare the park a protected area. Virdžinija Marina still believed that is what should happen when we spoke in late November.

I learned that the strategy has changed in a smaller working meeting at the seat of the municipality in February 2011. This meeting was attended by the core campaign collaborators, the director of the Province Institute and its two experts, one of whom wrote the new study, a horticulturalist from Varoš (also active in the biggest environmental NGO in Vršac), and the President and Vice-President of the Municipal Assembly. Drugi oktobar was not represented. The new idea presented by the director of the Province Institute was that the updated study would propose to put the park under a higher, second level of protection. It was clear that other participants have been briefed about the proposal beforehand, and they supported it unanimously.

Several kinds of justifications were presented for this shift. Perhaps the most official one is based on a match between the value of the park and the legal definition of the levels of protection. The 2009 Law on Nature Protection labels the third level of protection as a ‘protected area of local importance’, whereas the second level indicates a ‘protected area of provincial/regional, i.e. substantial importance’. 20 The new study thus concludes:

According to the value of its contents, its features and the degree of their preservation, the City Park in Vršac stands out from other protected parks of Vojvodina, and is one of the more valuable parks of Serbia (PZZP, 2011, p. 2).

At the February meeting, the director of the Province Institute echoed this argument when she said that the park is one of the ‘most representative’ in Vojvodina. A few weeks later, the main author of the study told me she realised that the level of protection should be raised when she had described the ‘values’ of the park in the study.

However, it was apparent that some other considerations were driving the proposal as well as the support for it. These have to do with legal and institutional implications of upgrading the protection status. Significantly, acts on the establishment of protected areas of the second category must be adopted by the National Assembly of Serbia or, if the area to be protected is in Vojvodina, by the Assembly of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. Self-government of the municipality where the protected area is situated, as a lower branch of the government, must comply with the act. Importantly, the Institute for Nature Conservation which has prepared the protection study may recommend a custodial institution for the protected area, but the latter should be selected in a public competition where possible, and is ultimately appointed by the act. Finally, if the protected area is established by an act of the Province Assembly, protection measures are funded by the province budget and their execution supervised by a province inspection rather than a municipal one.

19 The company’s full name is the Varoš Public Enterprise for Construction, Development and Regulation of the City and the Territory of the Municipality of Vršac. It is a public company implementing various municipal projects, especially in construction; more recently, it has also become the custodial institution of some protected natural areas. Varoš is not the custodial institution of the City Park, but it is formally charged with financial and expert supervision of Drugi oktobar in its execution of custodial duties. However, the informal balance of power is such that in practice, Drugi oktobar chooses itself what it wants to do in the park (i.e., most basic maintenance) and Varoš pays for its services with money allocated from the municipality budget.

20 Article 41, Zakon o zaštiti prirode [Закон о заштити природе], Službeni glasnik RS [Службени гласник РС] no. 36/2009.
Why was all this important? Even the protection study with its rather formal, restrained language discloses some of the reasons.

The current managing institution, the Drugi oktobar Social Enterprise, did not have an act on internal order and guard service; an act on fees for the use of the protected area, or a management plan. Annual management programs were not being regularly drafted.\textsuperscript{21} Because of that, there was no difference between the treatment of the City Park and that of other public green spaces so that management was reduced to mere maintenance, mainly lawn mowing, flower parts upkeep, removal of devitalised trunks and the like. The managing institution never marked the protection area boundary according to the 1973 decision in force so that conditions of protection\textsuperscript{22} were never solicited for the works on the plots with the greenhouse and the service yard\textsuperscript{23} (PZZP, 2011, pp. 47–48).

Indeed, in the interviews, but also working meetings I was able to attend, most initiators of the public advocacy campaign singled out the management of Drugi oktobar as the main culprit for the situation. The protection study seems to support this view but does not suggest any reasons. When I interviewed Biljana Panjković, director of the Province Institute, she only spoke generally about ‘lack of communication’, ‘lack of interest’ and the like. Dejan Maksimović, a key collaborator of the advocacy campaign,\textsuperscript{24} was more specific at the October roundtable, in his text published in the campaign booklet as well as when we spoke – the problem is that the custodial institution of the park is also its user, and in such situations the economic interest tends to prevail (korisnik; korisnik). Indeed, Drugi oktobar runs the restaurant in the attractive period building of the former cake shop and also uses the greenhouse and the service yard. Its approach to protection is illustrated by an episode from 2007 when Dejan still worked in the Municipality Council. On an ‘initiative of a Municipality Council member’ (probably Dejan himself), Drugi oktobar drafted a ‘working plan’ for the park, had it approved by the Province Institute and received an initial 30\% of the planned budget from the municipality; however, it did not implement any of the planned interventions and therefore did not receive the outstanding funding (Građanski parlament, 2010, p. 37). Some campaign participants implied that Drugi oktobar perhaps even wished to construct some new objects in the park or its surroundings. While this is arguably a conjecture, it is noteworthy that in a November 2010 letter to the Province Institute, Drugi oktobar protested against ‘an expansion of the protection area boundary’\textsuperscript{25} and ‘a change of the protection regime’ (PZZP, 2011, p. 47).

\textsuperscript{21} These are all obligations of the custodial institution of a protected area laid down by the current environmental law (See Article 58, Zakon o zaštitii prirode no. 36/2009). The 1973 act only obliges the custodial institution to develop a ‘plan of maintenance i.e. regulation’ and submit it for an approval by the Province Institute and the Municipal Assembly.

\textsuperscript{22} For many interventions in protected areas, one of the necessary legal prerequisites is that the subject intending to carry out the intervention solicits a decision on ‘conditions of nature protection’ (uslovi zaštitii prirode; услови заштите природе) from the relevant one of the two state Conservation Institutes. See Article 57, Zakon o zaštitii prirode no. 36/2009.

\textsuperscript{23} The historical greenhouse and the service yard at the boundary of the park are being used by Drugi oktobar. Due to complex cadastral changes in the meantime, I was not able to determine whether they were put under protection by the 1973 act or not. However, it is clear that the greenhouse was put under protection by the 2000 revision, and in any case plots of land in an immediate vicinity of a protected area are subject to many environmental regulations applying to protected areas themselves (for instance, a decision on the ‘conditions of nature protection’ must be obtained for any construction works which could impact the protected area). Since the 2011 study found that the service yard has, in the meantime, lost all features which would require protection (i.e., it is fully asphalted), it leaves it out from the protected area. As for the greenhouse and the plot of land on which it stands, making up 2.35\% of the revised protected area, the third rather than second level of protection is suggested.

\textsuperscript{24} Dejan is one of the founders and the President of the Gea Natural Science Society, the biggest environmental NGO in Vršac, and one of the founders and the Program Director in the Staniše Environmental Center, a more recently established NGO. From 2004–2008, he was the Member of the Municipal Council (an executive branch of local self-government) for Environment, representing the Serbian Radical Party; he is currently a member of the Serbian Progressive Party which took a large part of the Radical Party’s membership. He worked with Virdžinija Marina on the project draft and authored a text for the campaign booklet (Građanski parlament, 2010, pp. 35–38).

\textsuperscript{25} This might be referring to the request of the municipal government that the plot of land with the exhibition pavilion and the service yard is included in the protected area. The Province Institute refused this as it found no grounds for
Whatever the reasons for the failure to meet the obligations of custodial institution, an important question remains why the municipality kept tolerating the situation. Clearly, the participants and allies of the campaign saw as one of the greatest benefits of the new strategy discussed at the February meeting that a province inspection body rather than the municipal inspection would be charged with supervising the custodial institution. Biljana Panjković said that she does not wish to suggest any doubts about the quality of the municipal inspection but the Province Institute has very good experiences with the work of the province inspection.\(^{26}\) Even the President and Vice-President of the Municipal Assembly supported the shift which suggests they believed that another institution should be able to provide a better protection than local self-government which they represent.

Obviously, the roots of this status quo need to be sought in the relationship between the municipal government and Drugi oktobar. Some of the exchanges at the October roundtable were particularly revealing in this respect. First, Dejan remarked that in 2005, the period when he was active in the Municipal Council, they succeeded to get the draft act based on the 2000 revision on the agenda of the Municipal Assembly. However, it was dropped from the agenda because ‘certain party opposed it’, and the same recurred in 2006. Later in the discussion, he insisted that a ‘third interested party’ needs to be involved in the process. When directly asked which party is that, Dejan answered it is the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS). Significantly, Ljubisav Šljivić, director of Drugi oktobar, is also a SPS representative in the Municipal Assembly and, according to many, the most powerful individual in that party in Vršac. He held the director’s office already in the SPS-dominated Milošević era. Dejan’s answer provoked Milan Matijašević, director of Varoš, the Member of the Municipal Council for Infrastructure and another member of the local leadership of the SPS, to retort that ‘SPS will not be a brake of any positive trends’. He claimed that SPS is a modern, progressive party which will support any constructive steps to ensure that the park will serve the citizens. He further said that the meeting should not be spent on analysing who is responsible for what and that he thought that we are ‘beyond this era of conspiracy theories’. All this shows that both Dejan and Matijašević found it natural to speak from particular party positions while also representing formally non-partisan stakeholders of the protection of the park (an environmental NGO and a communal enterprise).

The coalition governing in Vršac since 2008 consists of the Vršac Region – European Region Movement (Pokret VRER), the Democratic Party (DS), and the electoral coalition of the SPS with the smaller Party of Unified Retirees of Serbia (PUPS). The only party in opposition is thus the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) which has been the governing party from 2004–2008. Given the numbers of representatives of these parties in the Municipal Assembly, the Pokret VRER (eighteen representatives out of 45) and the DS (fifteen representatives) would have been able to form a coalition without the SPS-PUPS coalition (four representatives). However, the interviewees emphasised that the Pokret VRER and the SPS are very close in Vršac and many individuals are simultaneously members of both parties, forming a kind of block against the DS. They further explained Šljivić’s power by its economic aspect; Drugi oktobar runs a water treatment plant, sewage system, a hotel, the restaurant in the park and a local TV, it distributes water and gas and, importantly, employs hundreds of people. Finally, they claimed that although Drugi oktobar is protection on that plot (PZZP, 2011, p. 38). In effect, due to cadastral changes the 2011 study reduces slightly the territory of the protected area. I was not able to determine whether the 1973 act included the exhibition pavilion and the service yard in the protected area because the whole territory of the park was divided into plots with completely different sizes and cadastral numbers than is the case now.

\(^{26}\) The 1973 act identifies both municipal government and the Province Institute as supervising bodies. However, since protection was established by an act of the municipality, the assumption seems to be that it is the municipality which should supervise Drugi oktobar on an everyday level. Until a new act which changes the institutional framework of the protection of the park is adopted, the municipality is also responsible for replacing the custodial institution if the latter does not meet its obligations.
formally a ‘social enterprise’ (by now a rare form of ownership which has originated under socialism), it is actually ‘in the hands’ of the leadership, i.e. Šljivić and his closest associates.

The episode at the October roundtable attests to the fact that the campaign became an arena of civil deliberation, however limited, in which one of the well-guarded local ‘public secrets’ was, briefly and partially, exposed to daylight. This is a story about the murky zone in which personal and party-mediated links weld governance and economic interest to the point of making them almost indistinct. Many people are well familiar with these underlying relationships, but precisely of their informal nature they typically only discuss them in private, with people one can trust, which is why they often become very persistent obstacles to transformation. This has certainly been the case in Vršac where the leadership of Drugi oktobar, its custodianship of the park and the lack of effective municipal supervision over the latter all remained constants for decades.

In the spring of 2011, it seemed that the campaign was making a breakthrough. The involvement of the Province Institute and the possibility of conveniently circumventing the stalemate in local power relationships by ‘elevating’ (дигнутi; дигнут) the park’s protection to the province level, as the participants would repeatedly describe it, was one enabling factor. It was also attractive to the municipal government because it would divest it of its (unmet) obligation to fund the protection measures. Another circumstance mentioned by the interviewees was that 2011 was a pre-election year and politicians would wish to present themselves as doing something about the park. However, I would suggest that at least equally important was the fact that the campaign tackled the informal local politics with an informality of its own.

First of all, several key campaign initiators and allies are or used to be simultaneously active in civil sector, on the one hand, and local politics or public sector, on the other. They thus possessed and employed insider knowledge of the interests and relationships of key formal and informal political actors. The case of Dejan Maksimović has been already mentioned. Orhideja Štrbac, horticulturist from Varoš who attended the public meetings, is also active in Gea. Dejan also knew Biljana Panjković from before, and was actually first to contact her about the campaign. Further, Virdžinija Marina mobilised her personal links to the DS which became the key political sponsor of the initiative – both representatives of local self-government attending the February meeting were from that party. Stevica Nazarčić, President of the Municipal Assembly who also attended the October roundtable, told me that he knows Virdžinija for a long time; in the 1990s, they started publishing a magazine together. According to Virdžinija, he was one of the founders of Građanski parlament in the Milošević era. At the meetings, he addressed Virdžinija with the informal second-person singular pronoun tи (mu). Finally, at the February meeting, the issue of who would be the new custodial institution was also discussed, although formally this should be determined by a public competition. The attendees agreed that Varoš, represented at the meeting by Orhideja Štrbac, would make a good new custodial institution, given that it recently proved to be competent in that role in another protected area in the municipality and that, as Biljana Panjković remarked, ‘it has an assistance of the nongovernmental sector’ – referring presumably to the fact that Orhideja Štrbac forms a bridge with Gea whose President is Dejan Maksimović, and that the public enterprise and the NGO cooperated in the past.

Interestingly, some of the civil-society actors strived to discursively maintain the boundary with political society, although not necessarily all the time, while mobilising informal relationships with the same. This was especially the case with Virdžinija. In her discourse, she would oppose ‘partisan’ (партиjski; партиски) and ‘civil’ (GRAĐANSKI; ГРАЂАНСКИ) as two different value orientations which people may possess. In a September 2010 meeting with representatives of BCIF in which the campaign was discussed, Virdžinija said: ‘My problem is that I don’t fit into the pattern (не падам у шаблон; не падам у шаблон) of the Democratic Party or some other party in Vršac. That is an incredibly closed environment.’ However, in an interview, she told me that according to its statute, Građanski parlament is an organisation which ‘does politics’ and works as ‘a kind of political watchdog’. In the 1990s, Građanski parlament was supporting ‘democratic, pro-
European forces’ – it was closest to the DS and the League of Vojvodina Socialists, but it remained independent and ultimately even those who were earlier its allies started to see it as an ‘enemy’. Virdžinija herself used to be a member of another party, the left-liberal Civic Alliance of Serbia which ceased to exist in 2007.

In sum, the implementation of the campaign was, in many respects, telling as to how the presumptions of advanced liberal governmentality work out in a reality of local politics shaped by past forms of rule and long-standing informal relationships. First, while the participation of the ‘community’, i.e. individuals not affiliated with the CSOs, the municipality government or public sector, was minimal, the engagement of higher-tier governance institutions (especially the Province Institute) proved crucial for the success of the campaign. Second, while the discourse of public advocacy defines formalised political changes as the objective, the path to the former, if it is to be successful, may often be as informal as it gets. This often puts the CSOs into a paradoxical position discussed above. It invites them to form a particular kind of ‘partnership’ with political society while they are faced with an empirical reality in which a rather different type of relationships is more likely to succeed – one that can compromise their independent status as a source of their legitimacy vis-à-vis the state. The ethical and practical dilemmas involved are thus often provisionally resolved by a rhetoric which reinforces the boundaries of civil sector and political society.

Despite the optimistic mood of the February meeting, as of September 2011 it remains to be seen whether the campaign has actually achieved a positive change. The initiators were told that the Province Institute has submitted the protection study to the province government, but the province act has not been adopted yet and the exact reasons for this were unknown to them.

Conclusions

This paper subjected to a political analysis what I argued are attempts to introduce ‘advanced liberal’ governmentality to Serbia through recent stages of ‘civil-society building’. Public advocacy and local fundraising as new civil-society practices and discourses are closely associated with central pillars of the contemporary development mainstream such as ‘participatory democracy’ and ‘good governance’. I attempted to go beyond the ideological binaries of political society and civil society, old and new, to show that civil-society building in postsocialism is a deeply political process and part and parcel of comprehensive transformations of the society and governance. Its outcomes depend on the agency and subjectivities of civil-society members and their relationships with the state, political organizations, foreign donors and various social groups, and these in turn are conditioned by the rich genealogy of past and present governmentalties. In its efforts to reconfigure these relationships and instill new ‘techniques of the self’, advanced liberal governmentality confronts its own internal contradictions and the legacies of socialism, ethnonationalism and the political economy of international development.

Public advocacy and local fundraising projects can promote the construction of a more democratic and equitable Serbian society, and some have already done so in their local spheres of influence. Nevertheless, their success often depends on the ability of civil-society actors to mobilise some elements of the historically shaped local forms of civility as well as ‘points of access’ to political society which differ from those envisaged by advanced liberal rule. The actors trying to develop public advocacy and local fundraising should take stock of the fact they are not starting from a clean slate, and approach with skepticism the assumptions and strategies of the underlying governmentality. Moreover, while some of the locally established practices and meanings can be employed for new purposes, other indeed represent obstacles to democratisation. However, these cannot be adequately addressed in the neoliberal framework with its tendency to a depoliticised treatment of historically specific phenomena of political culture and political economy.
REFERENCES


Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju (CeSID) (2005) Političke podele u Srbiji u kontekstu civilnog društva (Belgrade: CeSID).

Collin, M. (2001) This is Serbia Calling: Rock’n’Roll Radio and Belgrade’s Underground Resistance (London: Serpent’s Tail).


