A Conceptual Framework for Human Security

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Working Definition and Executive Summary

Human security has many useful definitions and characterizations. Although these will be introduced and discussed shortly, this paper aims not to choose among them, but rather to provide a working definition of human security, and to show how it can form the basis for operational responses by many different institutions. This six-page executive summary opens with a “working definition” of human security, then provides an introduction to key terms, and a summary of the main discussions set forward in the attached paper.

The proposed working definition of human security is as follows:

**Working Definition:**

The objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment.

Human security take its shape from the human being: the vital core that is to be protected. Institutions that undertake to protect human security will not be able to promote every aspect of human well-being. But at very least they must protect this core of people’s lives.

The next sections introduce the terms of the working definition in order:

**Safeguard**

Human security is deliberately protective. It recognizes that people and communities are fatally threatened by events well beyond their control: a financial crisis, a violent conflict, AIDS, a national policy that undercuts public and private investments in health care, a terrorist attack, water shortages, chronic destitution, or pollution in a distant land. Many threats are far more destructive if they come as a surprise. The damage and deaths of an earthquake can be minimized by producing earthquake resistant buildings; the impoverishing effects of a financial crisis can be mitigated if counter-measures are put in place in advance; early warning systems can reduce the effect of famine. Yet many of these preparations require threats to be acknowledged, before they occur (or at the very least, as they occur). The human security approach urges institutions to offer protection which is institutionalised, not episodic; responsive, not rigid; preventative, not reactive. In this way, people will face inevitable downturns “with security.”

Safeguarding human lives implicates not only those institutions that intend to promote human security overtly, but also institutions that unintentionally undermine it. The strategies that are associated with providing human security identify the threats and then seek to prevent threats from materializing, mitigate harmful effects for those that eventuate, and help victims cope. But

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2 Alternate phrasings of this definition include:
   1. The objective of human security is to protect the vital core of all human lives. (instead of protect: shield, guarantee, defend, maintain, uphold, preserve, secure, safeguard, ensure that…are shielded)
   2. The objective of human security is to protect the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment. (*initial definition was this*)
   3. The objective of human security is to guarantee a set of vital rights and freedoms to all people, without unduly compromising their ability to pursue other goals.
   4. The objective of human security is to create political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental conditions in which people live knowing that their vital rights and freedoms are secure.
   5. The objective of human security is to keep critical pervasive threats from invading the vital core of human lives.

3 Sen 2000
there is a second strategic approach to human security protection, which is *respect*. Respect for human security means that *whatever their primary objective may be*, all actors, whether institutional or corporate or individual, must ascertain that their actions do not foreseeably albeit unintentionally, threaten human security. This sense of respect has a close relationship to respect for individual human beings.

The term 'safeguard' must not be misunderstood. Human security is people-centred, not threat-centred. Human security is a condition that results from an effective political, economic, social, cultural, and natural environment, and not from executing a set of administrative procedures. But to uphold human security effectively, a proactive attitude towards threats – whether they are sudden threats such as an earthquake or the ongoing threats faced by the destitute – is essential.

Finally, the term safeguard is intended to convey a sense of dependability. It will be unprecedented not to mention difficult to protect human security with the kind of force and effectiveness that characterises responses to national security threats. But the aim of human security is to do precisely that.

**Vital Core**

Human security is contained in scope. It does not cover all necessary, important, and profound aspects of human living. Rather, it identifies and protects a limited vital core of human activities and abilities. These may be variously described by certain fundamental human rights, basic capabilities, or absolute needs.

The “vital core” is a non-technical term for the concerns that lie behind human security. It may be defined in the space of capabilities, the freedom people have to do and to be. Elements of the vital core are fundamental human rights which all persons and institutions are obliged to respect or provide, even if the obligations are not perfectly specifiable. The rights and freedoms in the vital core pertain to survival, to livelihood, and to basic dignity. Persons who enjoy rudimentary security as to their survival, livelihood, and dignity even during terrible circumstances of poverty or war or disaster, would be better off than billions are today.

The working definition does not specify the rights and freedoms that pertain to the vital core beyond identifying these three categories. The task of prioritizing among rights and capabilities, each of which is argued by some to be fundamental, is a value judgement and a difficult one, which may be best undertaken by appropriate institutions. Yet the judgment is necessary if human security is to be realistic and effective. So there is a foreseeable tension between (i) the need for participatory engagement and scrutiny of this “core” by many, especially by those whose security is endangered, and (ii) the need for international agencies, NGOs, and public institutions, among others, clearly to define a “vital core” and to create procedures and institutions that prepare to protect it effectively. The imperfect but operational response to this tension is to maintain a self-consciously vague, wide working definition of human security, and to articulate *procedures* for operationalizing this definition in concrete situations by constrained institutions, for particular populations.

**All Human Lives**

Human security is “people-centred”; it focuses the attention of institutions on human individuals and their communities worldwide. This emphasis on human beings distinguishes human security from the objective of protecting state territories that dominated security policies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Human security shifts that focus to persons, regardless of gender, race, religion, ethnicity, citizenship, or other distinguishing characteristics.

In this way the human security approach parallels the movement in economic development and international law to shift the emphasis from instrumental objectives (such as growth, or state rights) to human development and human rights. In doing so the human being becomes the
“end” of development, not only as a “means” to increased economic productivity or legal coherence, and these various activities in turn become “people-centred”.

It may be important to note that human security does not obviate state security, nor does it encompass all of the security agenda (which also includes for example territorial integrity and the distribution of power among nations). Furthermore, the focus on “all human lives” does not require or assume a humanitarian or altruistic motivation. Actions that protect human security will often be justified within a group’s or nation’s self-interest, narrowly defined, and will often require this political appeal. At the same time, human security sketches out how national governments can reorient their own security policies, providing the same rigour and force, but with a somewhat different emphasis.

**Critical and Pervasive Threats**

The focus of human security is squarely on human lives. But in order to protect human lives effectively, actors must deliberately identify and prepare for distinct threats. Threats to human security are critical – that is, they threaten to cut into the core activities and functions of human lives. Such threats may be sudden – as in economic collapse – but they need not be, for what defines a threat as critical is its tragic depth rather than its suddenness. Furthermore, the threats are pervasive – meaning (i) the threat is large scale (within the population under consideration; what is large scale will differ for local vs. international institutions); and/or (ii) the threat may come again and again over time; it is not an anomalous event for which strategic preparation is impossible. Of course pervasive threats may not occur ‘en masse’; a man may be incapacitated by a work accident, or by a wild animal; his family may live henceforth in penury. This may seem to be an isolated rather than pervasive incident, yet it is multiplied millions of times over, making health insecurity qualify as a pervasive threat.

Human security threats have different mechanisms of operation. Some, such as genocide or soil degradation, threaten lives directly. Others are indirect threats: for example, when overinvestment in military or in debt repayment causes underinvestment in other areas, to an extent that leads to the collapse of the public health care sector, or when a country traditionally underinvests in education. Human security relates to the identification and assessment of both kinds of threats: those that are deliberately orchestrated, and those that arise inadvertently or structurally. For the human costs of each are high.

**Human Fulfilment**

Human security focuses on a limited core of individual activities and abilities, on a minimal subset of human development and human rights. It is not sufficient for human fulfilment or flourishing, which is the ongoing process of seeking and realizing values by people in groups and communities. It would, therefore, be unfortunate or even tragic if institutions aiming to achieve human security were to accomplish their objective in such a way that undermined people’s ability to be fulfilled and enjoy a far greater range of freedoms. People’s lives must not only be protected per se; they must be protected in a manner that is consistent with their long-term good. The importance of processes – of governance, of participation, of transparency, of capacity-building and institution-building – can hardly be overestimated. The appropriate way to effect this consistency between protection and longer term development will vary. Rudimentary poverty programs may attend to wider goals simply by encouraging deep participation; refugee camps may teach transferable vocational skills or may be sited where they will not degrade the local environment. In some places dangers, climate, or the rhythm of grief may be such that longer term considerations should be set aside for awhile. But they should not ever fall entirely from view.

The attention to longer term individual and group commitments does not threaten the focus of human security, because as the first part of the working definition clarifies, the priority of human

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4 The ‘or’ is used because some potential threats – environmental and nuclear – may be of such magnitude that they could not recur. But they nonetheless might be prevented.
security is to be effective – to protect human security in fact and not intention only. “In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced.”5

Concerns of feasibility are real; thus concern for realizing practical outcomes is basic to human security endeavours.

Summary of Sections Two to Five:

Why has human security risen to the fore of so many groups and conversations? The energy seems to arise from a mismatch between the security threats (that have changed dramatically with globalisation and technological advance) and the response in countries and by the international community to these threats. Although some threats have doubtlessly grown since the Cold War, so too has our capacity to counter them. Other threats have declined. Section 2 introduces these familiar issues. It identifies three descriptions of the altered security environments that are noted by nearly every contributor to the discussion:

1) Empirically observable changes in the nature of security threats, and in our ability to address them.
2) Analytical advances in the ability to understand the interdependence between different security threats, and also between the security of fellow citizens and persons across the globe.
3) Institutional changes both within security structures and at the national and international levels. These changes include the establishment of international crime and terrorist networks on the one hand, and deep international cooperation and collaboration in problem-solving on the other.

The need for a working definition of human security thus arises out of a real problem: how to frame a feasible and coherent set of priorities for concerted action. It is not an abstract question. The danger of inaction, and the danger of dissipation, are real.

Conceptions of human security vary widely (Section 3). The UNDP 1994 Human Development Report crafted by Mahbub ul Haq set the tone for all succeeding definitions by articulating a universal, preventive, “people-centred” approach that focused jointly on “freedom from fear and freedom from want.” Rothschild grounds human security by identifying linkages with security concepts at other points in history, and by articulating how human security extends the dominant approach to state security in Europe. She also proposes how to make human security less inclusive and as a result more feasible. Other authors develop multidimensional accounts of human security that are focused on people but differ in emphases. For example King and Murray leave violence aside and propose a human security index that measures the “years lived outside a state of generalized poverty.” Leaning and Arie argue that human security is a precondition of human development but include in their definition not only minimal standards of living but also cultural and psychological security that arises from social networks and attitudes towards the future. Hampson et al. describe human security as an underprovided public good which protects “core human values.” Thomas defends a wide definition of human security, which includes basic material needs, human dignity, and democratic practice. Paris proposes that human security should be seen not as a concept but rather as a category of research into military and non-military threats to societies, groups, and individuals. In practice, the International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty viewed human security as a central emerging concept for national and international institutions, particularly in view of the United Nations’ endorsement of this concept: “Ensuring human security is, in the broadest sense, the cardinal mission of the United Nations”. Japan’s foreign policy and the World Bank’s pillar of security in very different ways pursue the joint “freedom from fear and freedom from want.” Other nations such as Canada and Norway have developed an active agenda of discrete topics that populate the “freedom from fear” branch of concerns and lie within their own foreign policy. Both previous to and simultaneously with these proposals – most of which have

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5 1994:22
emerged in the past year or two — a literature has arisen that criticizes the concept of human security, on the grounds that it is vague, incoherent, or merely impossible.

In contrast to the whirlwind of definitions that precede it, the working definition here (i) maintains the joint focus on poverty and violence rather than selecting one or the other; (ii) maintains the “people-centred” nature of the 1994 UNDP definition; (iii) maintains multidimensionality; (iv) narrows prior definitions by focusing on “critical and pervasive threats to the vital core of people’s lives”; (v) proposes that the normative objective of human security be specified and translated into operational policies and projects by principled procedures (which are suggested but not discussed extensively). This working definition of human security is thus wide enough to incorporate many operational expressions of human security, which can be understood to be not “competing conceptions” but rather appropriate initiatives to protect human security in concrete circumstances. It also recognizes that much of the energy needed to address human security concerns is politically as well as rationally determined. The working definition thus “leaves room for reality” while providing analytical tools and insights so that political priorities for human security may be better conceptualized and addressed.

Section Four deepens the discussion of “vital core.” The term “vital core” is not meant to be precise; it suggests a minimal or basic set of capabilities or human rights or absolute poverties. What is this core? It is founded not on a fragile consensus nor on the identification of threats, but rather on practical reasoning about what is basic to a human life. In general terms, the vital core of human security may be thought of as a rudimentary set of human freedoms, or as some set of human rights. The vital core includes both political and civil liberties (related to ‘negative freedoms’), and economic, social, and cultural abilities (related to ‘positive freedoms’).

The strengths and limitations of this working definition can be seen by considering one particular element of human security, such as the freedom from premature preventable death. People who are trying to survive — whether it be a woman locking her door at night, or taking her children to be vaccinated — do not choose between addressing “violence threats” or “poverty threats”. They address both. Human security should do likewise. But people also risk their lives as fire-fighters and in sports, thus human security should leave people free to undertake valuable activities that are risky to some degree. Also, the protection even of the freedom from premature preventable death is complicated and requires vexing value judgments: what is “preventable”; which threats loom the largest; which means should we use? An example of this is where to set speed limits in order to prevent automobile accidents. These vexing issues recur with other dimensions of human security. In order to be relevant in different cultures and circumstances, a sound conceptual framework must be flexible as well as concrete — to allow for specifications that change over time and contexts. But this means that many pressing questions will be resolved only in practice, after both threats and implementing institutions have been identified.

Section Five relates this definition of human security to concepts of state security, human development, and human rights. There are a number of strong similarities between human and state security. Both proactively identify and prioritize critical and pervasive threats to the security of key populations, on the basis of empirical evidence and strategic analyses. At present both recognize key threats to be conflict, AIDS and disease, economic and financial instability, and terrorism. Both also develop systematic, comprehensive, durable, and coordinated institutional responses to selected threats that involve multiple actors and range from research to field action. The preparedness and response mechanisms use legal, political, sectoral, and economic as well as authorized military instruments.

Two differences between state and human security are also of note. First, state security largely concerns territorial units and the persons who dwell within them. Actions that promote the “human security” of other populations are usually justified instrumentally, because investments in their security are beneficial to national security; human security addresses all people. Second, state security is also significantly concerned with the relative distribution of power
between states and with territorial integrity; this agenda is legitimate and lively and complements, but is not part of, the human security agenda.

Human Security shares the “conceptual space” of human development, which is likewise people-centred and multidimensional and is defined in the space of human choices and freedoms. But human development is a broader, long term, holistic objective that can capture the aspirations of any society, whether rich or chronically poor. The aim of human development is the flourishing or fulfilment of individuals in their homes and communities, and the expansion of valuable choices. In contrast, human security has a strictly delimited scope. While both approaches address those who are already destitute, human security also has a systematic preventative aspect. While human development aims at “growth with equity,” human security focuses on “downturn with security.” The human security approach identifies and prepares for recessions, conflicts, emergencies, and the darker events of society. Finally, human security activities may at times have a much shorter time horizon, and include emergency relief work and peacekeeping as well as longer term human and institutional development.

Human Security and human rights are likewise deeply interconnected. Both are concerned to identify a rudimentary set of universal concerns that span poverty and violence. In fact fundamental human rights are arguably an appropriate working set for the “vital core” of human lives. However this paper leaves open the possibility that because of its focus on feasibility, human security may not necessarily prioritise all human rights equally, and in practice different institutions that respect or promote human security will legitimately prioritise and address only certain rights and freedoms. Still, to the extent that human security concerns at least some rights, institutions are clearly obligated to provide it.

The task of conceptualizing human security systematically may seem at times pedantic. In part, this may be in the nature of the presentation; one looks forward to a text with rich analyses and catching phrases and stories of hope. But then again there is a steady seriousness about the whole enterprise of protecting security. Not only are failures agonizing and human-made threats disheartening, but even success itself is less than rosy, precisely because the objective of human security is incomplete. People whose “vital core” is secure still face a universe of challenges, and obligations towards them are not fulfilled merely because they are not in grave risk. Yet social, political, diplomatic, economic, military, scientific, and technological institutions are unable to protect populations from all that threatens them. According to the human security agenda, whatever else these institutions undertake – and whether they work at the local, national, or international level – they must endeavour to safeguard the vital core functions of people everywhere. And they must do so in a way that does not compromise people and societies in the long term. Such an outcome is positive. When a mother is conscious that she and her family are not threatened by some problems (smallpox, for example) hers is, or can be, a more optimistic life. Human security can be a source of hope.

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6 Both quoted phrases from Sen 2000
**Figure 1: Summary of terms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, without impeding long-term human fulfilment.</th>
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| **Safeguard** | Provide and Promote Human Security by:  
Identification (of critical pervasive threats)  
Prevention (so that the risks do not occur)  
Mitigation (so that if risks occur the damage is limited)  
Response (so that victims or chronic poor survive with dignity and maintain their livelihoods)  
Respect Human Security by  
Identification, Prevention, and Mitigation of predictable side-effects that threaten human security, regardless of the primary objective |
| **Vital core** | A rudimentary but multidimensional set of human rights and human freedoms based in practical reason  
Spans the freedom from fear and the freedom from want  
To be specified by appropriate procedures in context |
| **All human lives** | “People-centred”- focused on individuals and their communities  
Universal and non-discriminatory |
| **Critical pervasive threats** | Critical threats cut into core activities and functions  
Pervasive threats are large-scale, recurrent dangers  
Threats may be direct, such as genocide or a civil war  
Threats may also be indirect, for example underinvestment or financial collapse. |
| **Long-term human fulfilment** | Human security is not sufficient for human fulfilment.  
Human security processes should be consistent with ongoing human development by supporting participation, freedom, institutional appropriateness, and diversity. |
1. Introduction

Human insecurity is an ancient phenomenon. Threats of famine, war, drought, flood, wild animals, plague, and enslavement appear in ancient writings across the world. The ancient tales of Gilgamesh, written about 2000 BC in what is now Iraq, tell of floods and scorpions, a mythological bull whose breath kills hundreds, and an ultimately unsuccessful quest for eternal youth. For descendants of Gilgamesh, the certainty of eventual death seems matched by the uncertainty of its time or manner. As a woman in contemporary Brazil said, “I do not know who to trust, the police or the criminals… We work and hide indoors… I am afraid that they might kill my son for something as irrelevant as a snack.” Human insecurity, however painful, is not an historic anomaly. What has changed, and changed considerably, are the kinds of insecurity that people face, and the institutional possibilities of tempering that insecurity.

Why do we need a conceptual framework for human security? This is a sensible question, not the least because Florini and Simmons ended their masterful review of potential definitions, theories, and conceptions of security (in general) by declaring that “too much disagreement exists” and so the conceptual debaters should stand down, and wield the same energy directly against security threats themselves. For a world that is primarily in need of direct and effective action, detailed conceptual reflection may seem spurious and distracting.

On the other hand, the very terrain under discussion is undeniably perplexing, requiring as it does: precise scientific and technological and environmental analyses of security threats (together with their associated probabilities and key preventive or mitigating measures); familiarity with local, national, transnational, and non-governmental institutional configurations worldwide (together with cultural understandings of key terms such as sovereignty, dignity, and security); clarity regarding the structure of international law and its various formal and informal support and enforcement mechanisms; and a deep historical appreciation of social security and social security theories and arrangements around the globe.

The description of extended security as a structure “of dizzying complexity” could hardly be more apt. So it actually might be quite refreshing to focus strictly on the concept of human security. It would be even better if a clear concept of human security could be articulated that would help groups to negotiate the incredible amount of information required for its effective operationalization. At best, the concept might routinely enable actors either to reach sufficient consensus for joint action, or to pinpoint key points of disagreement and the grounds of that disagreement.

The hope that conceptual clarity can ease the job of operationalizing human security does not seem to be an isolated view. As King and Murray report,

We conducted informal off-the-record interviews with politicians and officials responsible for the foreign policy in several countries that describe their policy as in some way based on human security. Virtually every person we spoke with was concerned that there existed no widely accepted or coherent definition of human security, and that there were considerable conceptual problems in relating human security, human development, and the development focus on poverty together in the articulation of their foreign policy.

At the same time, the hope that effective human security might be gracefully produced by a crisp definitional array is rather like the hope that producing a poetic set of “characteristics of effective dramatics” will make the job of judging your child’s elementary school drama competition effortless. The real turmoil arises not in understanding the concept of “effective dramatics” but in undertaking concrete judgments that necessarily exclude or disappoint. Unsteadiness also

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7 Narayan et al. 2000b.
8 1998:44.
9 Rothschild 1995:55
10 King and Murray 2000:6
arises from the rather daunting yet not-therefore-excluded task of prophesy that is often required in such circumstances – as expressed by the simple criterion, “rate the future potential of the child actor” (or security threat\(^1\)). The ability of conceptual frameworks to ease the burden of those in positions of responsibility is decidedly limited.

But in the hope that the discussion will nonetheless be of use to the operational task (particularly in creating a context for debate and policy-making), this paper proceeds in five sections.

The next section introduces the altered security environment that has mobilized the reconsideration of recent approaches to conflict, poverty, and state security. It identifies three descriptions of the altered security environments that are noted by nearly every contributor to the discussion:

1) **empirical** changes in the nature of security threats;
2) **analytical** advances, for example in understanding the interdependence between security threats;
3) **institutional** changes both within security structures and at the national and international levels.

The third section briefly makes the rounds of international institutions, countries, and researchers that propose alternative ways of defining and specifying human security. Diverse definitions of human security often reflect the comparative advantage of the implementing institution, or address threats that are not met by other means. This diversity is not only comprehensible; it is positively desirable. Thus the section concludes that any normative definition (such as this one) that aspires to be genuinely useful must be vague enough to include the diverse specifications. It may also be helpful to supplement the normative definition with a procedural account of how to specify the human security lens in concrete practical situations. In response to these conclusions, and building on others’ definitions, the fourth section proposes and elaborates a conceptual framework for human security. The fifth section relates this framework to state security, human development, and human rights. The sixth section closes.

A final and slightly apologetic note is appropriate regarding the sources. This framework draws on the extant human security literature available in English, as well as on some related literatures in human development, human rights, and national security. Unfortunately, such literature does not emerge evenly across the globe; one hopes that future discussions of human security will benefit more fully from discussions that are ongoing in other languages and within regions.

### 2. The Altered Security Environment

Why is human security, a notion that spans sectors and continents, and implicates people and groups at many levels, an appropriate focus of attention at this time?\(^2\) Why is it not enough for each responsible institution to address each urgency on a case-by-case basis?

\(^{11}\) For a critique of the predictive power of international relations theories see Gaddis in Lynn-Jones and Miller, 1993, who complains that ‘one might as well have relied upon star gazers, readers of entrails, and other ‘pre-scientific’ methods for all the good our ‘scientific’ methods did [in predicting Velvet Revolutions and other events at the end of the Cold War].’

The fundamental reason is that safeguard mechanisms to address certain security threats do not exist (although there may be multiple institutions that address other threats) and this may be because of oversight or the emergence of new threats rather than deliberate design. The configuration of security threats in this post-Cold War period of globalisation and technological advance is clearly different than it was until recently. Some threats are ancient and persistent; others are unprecedented.\textsuperscript{13}

But the further energy behind human security arises from an awareness that not only have threats increased; the opportunities to counter the threats \textit{have also increased}: “there is an enhanced possibility in the contemporary world to put our efforts and understanding together to achieve a better coordinated resistance to the forces that make human survival so insecure.”\textsuperscript{14} Technology as well as political changes have increased the possibility of effective coordination; scientific advances continue to expand our knowledge base; resources to address security threats are partially forthcoming. Thus whatever currently jeopardizes human security, the problem lies in the mismatch between security threats and response mechanisms.

The altered security environment can be sketched by superimposing different descriptions of recent changes in the security environment: empirical, analytical, and institutional. As these are familiar and have been extensively discussed they will be treated very briefly.

2.1 Empirically Observable changes

Empirical accounts of rising threats are exceedingly familiar, and reach us nearly daily in the press. For example, the nature of conflict has shifted to intra-state conflict, with higher incidence of civilian casualties. Population pressures together with consumerism contribute to environmental insecurity, increase immigration, and heighten the importance of water and energy resources. The economic crisis in East Asia not only obliterated financial and productive assets but dropped large populations roughly into unanticipated poverty. The spread of HIV/AIDS and the associated human costs of grief and caring for orphans leave indelible marks on communities. Inequality has increased, contributing to the mass mobilizations against globalisation and the agencies that promote it, which express, however inchoately, the sense that all is not just and well.\textsuperscript{15} Tragic events on and after September 11\textsuperscript{th} mobilized many institutions and resources in the world community as nothing else could have to act in concert in response to international terrorism. Other threats that increase or change in form include international criminal activity, nuclear proliferation and security, drug-resistant disease, financial collapse, ecological threats, technological mishaps, and conflicts across gender, class, ethnicity, or religion.

Empirical descriptions of security threats or of potential threats are essential to gauging the size and depth of a threat, to assessing how critical and pervasive it is or could be, and thus to mapping the landscape of security threats. They describe only a part of this landscape, however.

2.2 Analytical Advances

In response to a clearly altered security environment, theoretical, qualitative, and quantitative analyses unravel the causal relationships and interdependencies that link or activate security threats and form the basis for recommendations for action. Fields advance and generate operational responses in part by discovering interconnections such as the insight that famines


\textsuperscript{14} Sen 2000:2; that paper also presented this line of argument.

\textsuperscript{15} To take just one example, over the past two decades income inequality has risen in 48 of the 73 countries that have sufficient time series data, remained stable in 16 countries, and fallen in only 9 of these. Cornia and Court 2001.
are not inevitable results of a lack of food supply, and the observation that there has never been a famine in a country with a free press.\textsuperscript{16}

In the case of human security, the urgency of the problems rightly produces a search for insights that can be leveraged to safeguard human security. To give a central example, on the basis of a sequence of studies, insights into the interrelationship between poverty and conflict are emerging. While the relationship is not straightforward, despite the impatience of policymakers to make it so, there are clearly ways in which poverty contributes to conflict and vice versa.\textsuperscript{17} These insights and many others demonstrate the interrelationships between kinds of insecurity (not only poverty and conflict, but AIDS and information technology, or post-conflict crime and job-sharing, to name but a few). Such research may provide key insights for institutions that undertake to act.

The deepening analysis of interdependent insecurities provides a further reason to pursue human security, because persons recognize that there are considerable benefits from addressing interrelated variables (such as famine and voice, or poverty and conflict) jointly.

\textbf{2.3 International Cooperation}

The institutional configurations and capabilities to address security threats are changing rapidly, both within countries and internationally. Military configurations are changing in the post-Cold War world in response to distinct threats. Increased collaboration among development agencies and national governments, and the elaboration of common goals\textsuperscript{18} has started to enable the international community to address more dimensions of poverty in a more participatory and yet more coordinated fashion. Coordination has likewise increased in the private sector: within firms, in various fora and financial institutions, and in annual summits. International Conferences assess more deeply the issues of women’s rights, human rights, and conflict, and the mobilization of protesters has led to some constructive changes in indirect threats. Development agencies have recognized the need to address conflict, with the World Bank now even engaging in the demobilization of soldiers. Coordination among humanitarian, civilian and military agencies has also changed significantly, for example to justify military intervention to protect humanitarian action in the former Yugoslavia and northern Iraq. Thus the scope for a powerful and international response to human insecurities has never been greater.

Despite these advances, a deep and unsatisfactory division remains between emergency relief work and long-term poverty reduction work: “Organizationally speaking, the international community has two separate compartments, humanitarian and development, to respond to war-torn societies. However, the need of these societies do not fall into two neat categories. The reality demands much more simultaneous relief, rehabilitation and development interventions.”\textsuperscript{19} So while threats have escalated, and while collaborative possibilities have likewise “escalated” positively, there remains the need (and the possibility) to establish new institutions or institutional measures to address Human Security.

\textsuperscript{16} Sen 1981.
\textsuperscript{17} See Sen 2001 for a discussion of the interrelationships and also of the limitations of the analytical insights to date; also Stewart and FitzGerald 2001 Elaborate
\textsuperscript{18} Such as the International Development Targets or Millenium Goals, that aim for the:
1. Reduction of the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by half between 1990 and 2015;
2. Enrollment of all children in primary school by 2015;
3. Progress towards gender equality and empowering women, by eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005;
4. Reduction of infant and child mortality rates by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015;
5. Reduction of maternal mortality ratios by three-quarters between 1990 and 2015;
6. Provision of access for all who need reproductive health services by 2015;
7. Implementation of national strategies for sustainable development by 2005 so as to reverse the loss of environmental resources by 2015
\textsuperscript{19} Ogata 2001b:5
The term human security has a recent and increasingly wide usage, and it would be well to situate the concept proposed here in reference to that literature. The sections below survey a number of concepts of human security from academics and institutions; the last section recognizes critical voices (many of which are further discussed in Section 5.1).

3.1 1994 Human Development Report and subsequent United Nations Documents

This particular phrase, “human security,” is most often associated with the 1994 Human Development Report on Human Security drafted and championed by Mahbub ul Haq, even though the term itself was in circulation earlier. The intent of human security was to bridge the freedom from want and freedom from fear, freedoms that lay at the heart of the United Nations. As far back as June 1945, the U.S. Secretary of State reported this to his government on the results of the San Francisco Conference:

The battle of peace has to be fought on two fronts. The first is the security front where victory spells freedom from fear. The second is the economic and social front where victory means freedom from want. Only victory on both fronts can assure the world of an enduring peace.... No Provisions that can be written into the Charter will enable the Security Council to make the world secure from war if men and women have no security in their homes and their jobs.

As this discussion suggests, the phrase ‘freedom from fear’ is intended to indicate freedom from violence, and the phrase ‘freedom from want’, freedom from poverty. It is important to bear this mental equation in mind, because of course people also fear poverty and destitution; they also want peace and police protection. Also, although Buddhism might arguably offer the most effective response to ‘freedom from want’, the envisioned responses are political, social, economic, and environmental in nature.

But the 1994 Human Development Report was also explicitly crafted as an agenda for the Social Summit in Copenhagen, at which extensive discussion of the peace dividend was expected. Anticipating that audience, the report cut to the heart of security concerns, and emphasized their central concern with human beings: “In the final analysis, human security is a child who did not die, a disease that did not spread, a job that was not cut, an ethnic tension that did not explode in violence, a dissident who was not silenced. Human security is not a concern with weapons – it is a concern with human life and dignity.”

In a slightly more systematic mode, the report identified the following four essential characteristics of human security:

- Human security is a universal concern. It is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor.
- The components of human security are interdependent.
- Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention. It is less costly to meet these threats upstream than downstream.
- Human security is people-centred. It is concerned with how people live and breathe in a society, how freely they exercise their many choices, how much access they have to market and social opportunities – and whether they live in conflict or in peace.

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21 1994:3
22 1994:1-13; Extensive discussion of the peace dividend was expected at that conference, hence the chapter on “Capturing the Peace Dividend” 47-61
23 1994:22
24 ...
Finally, the 1994 UNDP report defined human security as:

1) Safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression.
2) Protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in jobs, in homes or in communities.

The report developed this definition in relation to seven dimensions of human security: personal, environmental, economic, political, community, health, and food security. The 1999 UNDP Human Development Report on Globalisation returned to the theme of human security, now in the aftermath of the 1998 Asian crisis. The report argued for deliberate actions to provide human security during economic crises, as well as to reduce other causes of human insecurity such as global crime, environmental degradation, and communication that threatens cultural diversity (because of the lack of diversity in films, languages, and norms on violence and pornography, that is prevalent in the media). It also called for a strengthening of the United Nations System, "giving it greater coherence to respond to broader needs of human security."  

The key premises of the 1994 UNDP report are (i) its joint focus on freedom from fear and freedom from want, and (ii) its four emphases on universality, interdependence, prevention, and people-centeredness. These formed, and continue to shape, human security discussions. For example, Kofi Annan, in his 2000 Report to the United Nations, We the People, gave the following broad description of human security:

Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human – and therefore national security.

But the surrounding discussions of the 1994 report, and in particular the breadth and apparent arbitrariness of the original seven dimensions, have led others to judge the concept of human security to be too all-encompassing for practical purposes, the report idealistic, and its recommendations naïve. While some of the harsher criticisms bear further discussion, it is fair to argue that the conceptual distinction between human development and human security was not sufficiently clear, as the dimensions do seem to embrace the entirety of the human development agenda unnecessarily. If human security is to be a feasible agenda it must be narrower. We will return to discuss the relationship of human security to human development in Section 5.2.

3.2 Rothschild: Historical Linkages and Prospective Issues

Many of the more applied articles on human security describe it with the excitement of discovery. In a balanced and scholarly manner, Emma Rothschild roots the current accounts of ‘extended security’ (of which human security is one) in its conceptual antecedents in European political thought. In doing so, she notes that the newer approach to security has extended the national security concepts that immediately preceded (and coexist with) it in four directions:

1) “from the security of nations to the security of groups and individuals: it is extended downwards from nations to individuals.

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25 1994:23
26 1999:102-104
27 1999:111
2) “from the security of nations to the security of the international system, or of a supranational physical environment: it is extended upwards, from the nation to the biosphere. The extension, in both cases, is in the sorts of entities whose security is to be ensured.

3) “extended horizontally, or to the sorts of security that are in question. Different entities (such as individuals, nations, and ‘systems’) cannot be expected to be secure or insecure in the same way; the concept of security is extended, therefore, from military to political, economic, social, environmental, or ‘human’ security.

4) “political responsibility for ensuring security (or for invigilating all these ‘concepts of security’) is itself extended: it is diffused in all directions from national states, including upwards to international institutions, downwards to regional or local government, and sideways to nongovernmental organizations, to public opinion and the press, and to the abstract forces of nature or of the market.”

Rothschild’s contribution not only positions human security and related approaches historically, it also proposes thought-provoking ways to make them “less inclusive.” One proposal is that international society should have “recourse to civil policies for preventing conflict,” in part because consensus regarding the use of force in conflict prevention would be difficult to obtain. Because “security requires the predictability and repetitiveness that are the endless propensities of the state,” Rothschild also defends an “extension and improvement in the formal institutions of international government,” institutions that would enjoy a number of powers including “the power to raise revenue.” In developing this proposal Rothschild raises salient issues of authority, coercion, resource generation, consensus-building, and subsidiarity. The proposal as it stands is worthy of ongoing consideration; one also hopes that similar historical analyses will be carried out in relation to other national or regional concepts.

3.3 King and Murray, Thomas, Hampson, and Leaning and Arie

A number of authors have focused on the freedom from need or vulnerability aspect of human security, whether this is caused by war or by structural events such as a financial crisis. For example, King and Murray define human security as an individual’s “expectation of a life without experiencing the state of generalized poverty.” They proposed an index of human security that includes “only those domains of well-being that have been important enough for human beings to fight over or to put their lives or property at great risk.” These domains are identified as health, education, income, political freedom, and democracy. Their index sets thresholds in each domain that are in some sense absolute; the index would identify a person as insecure if he or she fell below a threshold in any of the domains. Their approach does not include violence, but rather focuses on issues associated with the “freedom from want.”

Caroline Thomas, who outlines the increasing inequality brought by globalisation, and the insufficiency of current international measures to address it, writes that human security entails basic material needs, human dignity, and democracy:

Human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be met. Thus, while material sufficiency lies at the core of human security, in addition the concept encompasses non-material dimensions to form a qualitative whole. Human security is oriented towards an active and substantive notion of democracy, and is directly engaged with discussions of democracy at all levels, from the local to the global.

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29 1995:73
30 1995:86-87
31 2000:8
32 Given this criterion one might wonder at the exclusion of religious or ethnic identifications. See Paris 2001.
33 Global Governance p xi
King and Murray, and Thomas, recognize conflict-related threats, but, like UNDP 1994, emphasize the need to address poverty as a root cause of conflict. The key elements that they have adopted are the focus on the co-realisability of elements of multidimensional human security – in other words, that security is achieved only when all of them are in place – and the individual focus of human security, which is not amenable to the aggregative indices often used in Human Development. But on what grounds are the various domains of concern chosen? Roland Paris criticizes those who identify certain values as more important than others, without providing a clear justification for doing so. The process of identifying elements of human security is not elaborated; nor is it mentioned on what grounds their definitions would evolve.

According to Hampson and colleagues, “the concept of ‘security’ can be defined as the absence of threat to core human values, including the most basic human value, the physical safety of the individual.” They identify other core human values as physical security, and the protection of basic liberties, economic needs and interests. After tracing the distinct roots of human security – in human rights, in sustainable development, and in safety of the peoples – they argue that human security in all instances is regarded as an “underprovided public good.” This leads naturally to an analysis of what market failures and political failures have led to an under provision of human security. Hampson et al advocate a “portfolio diversification approach to human security,” which involves many actors.

Leaning and Arie develop a proposal for human security measurement with special attention to Africa. Their definition and exposition of human security is based in the human development and capability approach, yet emphasizes the psychological and the non-material aspects of security. They describe human security as a precondition for human development. Human security is:

an underlying condition for sustainable human development. It results from the social, psychological, economic, and political aspects of human life that in times of acute crisis or chronic deprivation protect the survival of individuals, support individual and group capacities to attain minimally adequate standards of living, and promote constructive group attachment and continuity through time.

They propose three key measurable components of human security: 1) a sustainable sense of home; 2) constructive social and family networks; and 3) an acceptance of the past and a positive grasp of the future. It is suggested that these components can be best measured by trends in their inverse indicators (proposed measures are: social dislocation, shifts in horizontal inequality, and discount rate). Their work raises in particular the need to address cultural and psychological dimensions (which are not easy to measure), without diluting or derailing the focus and compactness of human security as a “minimal set.”

3.4 Paris: Human Security as a Category of Research

Roland Paris argues that Human Security can be identified as a broad category of research on military and/or non-military threats to societies, groups and individuals. That is, he classifies security studies in a two by two matrix (Figure 2), with one axis that distinguishes studies concerned exclusively with military threats from studies of non-military security threats such as economic deprivation or environmental crises. The other axis distinguishes studies that conceive of the state as the appropriate unit of analysis for security studies from studies of security for societies, groups, and individuals. This partition seems a sensible division of studies that helps to orient human security in relation to the traditional security studies as well as to the wider “comprehensive,” “common,” and “global” security agendas that are still state-focused. It goes without saying that the four cells are not mutually exclusive: by definition the “military” columns single out a key subset of the “both” columns. Also there will be significant overlap between threats that affect states and those that affect individuals and groups. Paris'
work is useful, not only for his stunning survey and his recognition that multiple definitions of human security will and should persist, but also for his accurate delineation of human security research needs.

**Figure 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is the Source of the Security Threat?</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Military</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(conventional realist approach to security studies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societies, Groups, and Individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrastate security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(e.g., civil war, ethnic conflict, and democide)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3.5 The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

In December 2001, an International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty released their report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*. This Commission, chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, undertook to study the relationship between a) the rights of sovereign states, upon which the greater part of international relations has been built, and b) the so-called “right of humanitarian intervention” which has been exercised sporadically – in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo but not Rwanda – and with varying degrees of success and international controversy. The report addressed “the question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive – and in particular military – action, against another state for the purpose of protecting people at risk in that other state.”

While the focus of that report was clearly on the complex and contentious issues of state responsibilities to their own citizenry, the report did repeatedly refer to human security.

According to the report, human security is an emerging concept. It “means the security of people – their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Like the working definition proposed here, this “focuses attention where it should be most concentrated, on the human needs of those seeking protection or assistance” – human needs that include food, employment, and environmental protection. Furthermore, using the example of September 11, in which forty percent of those in the World Trade towers were non-Americans, the report argued that human security “is indeed indivisible. There is no longer such a thing as a humanitarian catastrophe occurring “in a faraway country of which we know little.” Thus the report argues (in the context of outlining the responsibility states have to protect the human security of their own citizens) for a reorienting of national security priorities to include not only military expenditures but also internal social security:

The fundamental components of human security – the security of people against threats to life, health, livelihood, personal safety and human dignity – can be put at risk by external aggression,

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36 Paris 2001:98
37 2001:vii
38 2001:15
39 2001:23
40 2001:5
but also by factors within a country, including “security” forces. Being wedded still to too narrow a concept of “national security” may be one reason why many governments spend more to protect their citizens against undefined external military attack than to guard them against the omnipresent enemies of good health and other real threats to human security on a daily basis.  

On the other hand, the report acknowledges that not all states will complete this responsibility. The centrality that human security has had in prominent statements by Kofi Annan raises to the question of what the international community should do when they fail to do so. In such cases, the report argued, international institutions do have a role in safeguarding human security:

The concept of human security – including concern for human rights, but broader than that in its scope – has also become an increasingly important element in international law and international relations, increasingly providing a conceptual framework for international action. Although the issue is far from uncontroversial, the concept of security is now increasingly recognized to extend to people as well as to states. It is certainly becoming increasingly clear that the human impact of international actions cannot be regarded as collateral to other actions, but must be a central preoccupation for all concerned. Whether universally popular or not, there is growing recognition worldwide that the protection of human security, including human rights and human dignity, must be one of the fundamental objectives of modern international institutions.

While concept of human security is not discussed or elaborated further in this report, the report does illustrate how the concept is being taken up and used in wider discussions.

3.6 The World Bank and Voices of the Poor

The World Bank has produced a very constructive contribution to the human security debate, although in this case they use the term security rather than human security. The World Bank’s World Development Report 2000/1 on Poverty identifies three pillars of poverty reduction efforts: facilitating empowerment, enhancing security, and promoting opportunities. The “security” pillar is described as follows: “Reducing vulnerability – to economic shocks, natural disasters, ill health, disability, and personal violence—is an intrinsic part of enhancing well-being and encourages investment in human capital and in higher-risk, higher-return activities.” In substance, the report uses security to refer not narrowly to economic security for vulnerable populations, but also to conflict prevention and/or resolution. It identifies priority areas for international cooperation, which include not only international financial stability, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, agricultural advances, and environmental protection, but also a reduction in arms trade, and post-conflict reconstruction.

The key contribution of this report from the human security perspective is the organic fusion of hitherto disparate areas of study: risks and vulnerabilities (including natural disasters, health threats, violence, safety nets, economic, political, and environmental risks), risk management strategies (prevention, mitigation, coping), and studies that recognize distinct strategies depending upon the size and nature of the affected community from the level of the individual household to the international community and planet. As the “security” emphasis seems to have arisen independently of the human security literatures (and their associated interest in resource mobilization), it underscores the coherence and relevance of this “poverty-conflict” nexus of concerns.

A separate but related awareness of human security has arisen repeatedly from listening to people talk about security. In a special survey undertaken by UNDP field offices, people’s definitions of security included absence of war, the liberty to pray, safety from rape, “enough for the children to eat,” and marriage itself. The intensity and diversity of security concerns also emerged in Voices of the Poor, a World Bank study that accompanied the WDR 2000/1, where focus groups commented on their interpretations of insecurity. Insecurity meant malaria; it

41 2001:15; see also 13
42 2001:6
43 World Bank 2000/1
44 UNDP 1994:23
meant poor health and sanitation; it meant police violence; it meant the fear of disability or chronic illness; it meant domestic violence; it meant the unemployment, it meant inflation. Curiosity about people’s views, and commitments to listening to them, is not only a recent phenomenon; as Sucharithanarugse notes, “The cultural heritage of East Asia includes numerous stories of rulers disguising themselves and mixing with the populace so that they could listen to them and act with greater wisdom.” These exercises reveal the disparate and far-ranging concerns that people have – concerns that challenge narrowly materialist understandings of security, as we will see.

The World Bank also has undertaken to work on conflict: in the 1990s, 24% of IDA commitments (excluding those for China and India) went to countries that had experienced significant civil conflicts, and the Bank works in 37 post-conflict countries. The Bank thus defined its rules of engagement for client countries at various stages of their internal violence, and also developed a post-conflict unit and fund that has given grants in 27 countries, and programs such as de-mining and reintegration of displaced persons. In January 2001, it issued an Operational Policy 2.30 “Development Cooperation and Conflict” that opens with the sentence, “The Bank recognizes that economic and social stability and human security are preconditions for sustainable development.” The Bank’s understanding of the term “human security” was suggested in the Post Conflict’s 1999 paper, “Security, Poverty Reduction & Sustainable Development: Challenges for the New Millennium”: the traditional notions of security (threats to the state, military defense, and nuclear disarmament) are giving way to contemporary understandings of the term (“human” or personal, security; freedom from crime, violence, and oppression). Today, security comprises two interrelated concepts: the state’s role in protecting its borders from external threats and its role in ensuring ‘human security’ for its citizens under the broader umbrella of human rights – meaning that every person is entitled to be free of oppression, violence, hunger, poverty, and disease and to live in an clean and healthy environment.

This definition links freedom and rights (as we will below), and also joins the substantive agenda that addresses oppression and violence on the one hand, and hunger, poverty, disease and the environment on the other.

3.7 Regional Security Structures

Human security does not imply that the military must dilute its focus on defence and melt into the purveyor of primary education, highway construction, and drug control. A great range of writers focus on the transformed military and alliance configurations that would be required to protect human security. Adebayo Oyebade and Biodun Alao argue that from the African perspective the concern in the West about upcoming security rivals with China or South Asia may be a “blessing in disguise” – and even, to quote Wole Solinka, “the greatest development incentive that ever came our way since the end of slavery” because Africa clearly now carries the burden of African security. They argue that the gains of the Post Cold War period, which relieves Africa from the West’s ideological struggle, should be consolidated “in a Pan-African

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45 Narayan et al. 2000a, 2000b
46 in Tow et al. 2000:52
47 World Bank 1998:23
48 Hampsen et al. are critical of the World Bank because it focuses on political rather than market failures as causes of conflict. “Beyond factoring conflict as a cause of disruption in the development process and as a possible consequence of unequal development, World Bank documents and reports do not conceive of unequal distribution or global inequities in wealth and income as a security issue per se’ 2002:157, criticizing in particular de Ferranti et al, 2000.
49 World Bank 2001b:1
50 1999:7
51 Dunlap wrote a tongue-in-cheek article in the US Army War College Quarterly where he pictured a coup by the military in 2012, by which time the military had become the most respected and all-embracing US institution, but one whose fighting capacities were sorely diminished.
security system that would encompass, among other features, economic integration and cooperation, and a collective conflict resolution apparatus.\(^5\)\(^2\)

The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) has developed a brief of work that encompasses the human security agenda. For example, the founding document in October 2001 noted that “Long-term conditions for ensuring peace and security in Africa require policy measures for addressing the political and social vulnerabilities on which conflict is premised.”\(^5\)\(^3\) In June 2002, the ‘Parliaments Uniting for African Unity’ conference organized by the South African Parliament included a session on Peace and Human Security. The July 2002 meeting of the African Union (AU) and NEPAD also included civil society sessions on human security.

The Organization of American States (OAS) similarly is reconsidering their concept of security. They describe the need to reassess their approach to hemispheric security in this way: “The concept of security, once framed largely in conventional military terms, today must take into account a range of evolving threats – international terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, illegal arms dealing, institutional corruption, organized crime. In some countries, poverty, disease and environmental degradation further threaten stability and undermine security.”\(^5\)\(^4\) In 2004 the OAS will convene a conference on hemispheric security to review and adopt a new approach to hemispheric security.\(^5\)\(^5\)

Regional security approaches have a number of common concerns; in particular deep worries arise regarding sovereignty and the possibility of intervention. For example in an ASEAN meeting

Thailand, supported by the Philippines, proposed moving from a policy of “constructive engagement” with Myanmar to one of “constructive intervention” or “flexible engagement.” Indonesia came out strongly against the idea, arguing that it ran counter to ASEAN’s basic principle of respecting the sovereignty of the state. Malaysia then weighed in to the argument by reportedly suggesting that Thailand would not like it if Malaysia started commenting on the treatment of Muslims in southern Thailand.\(^5\)\(^6\)

These discussions raise sovereignty – as well as human rights and cultural values – as live issues that surface in implementation.

3.8 Canada, Norway, and Japan: Appropriate Focusing

The operationalization of human security by committed institutions in a way that is relevant to their contexts has naturally given rise to somewhat narrower interpretations of human security. For example Canada, Norway, and Japan have incorporated human security into their foreign policy frameworks.

Canada has taken human security as the paradigm for its foreign policy and has taken a leadership role in operationalizing it.\(^5\)\(^7\) Canada’s foreign policy framework has maintained a distinctive focus on peace, security, development, and international cooperation throughout the Cold War. The human security agenda has offered a way for Canada to contribute “a leading voice on the world stage.”\(^5\)\(^8\) It was in the Ottawa Convention that the landmines treaty was signed – something that Lloyd Axworthy, one of the energies behind Canada’s human security

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\(^{5}\)\(^2\) Oyebade and Alao 1998:189.

\(^{5}\)\(^3\) http://www.avmedia.at/cgi-script/csNews/news_upload/NEPAD_2dCORE_2dDOCUMENTS_2edbl.NEPAD%20FRAMEWORK%20DOCUMENT%20ENGL.pdf Para 73 page 16

\(^{5}\)\(^4\) www.oas.org, description of key issue ‘hemispheric security’ accessed 9-22-03.

\(^{5}\)\(^5\) AG/doc.4198/03 approved May 21, 2003; http://www.oas.org/XXXIIIGA/english/docs/agdoc4156_03add1rev1.pdf P 125

\(^{5}\)\(^6\) Sucharithanarugse in Tow et al. 2000:59

focus, described as the “first major accomplishment” of the human security agenda. By 2000, when human security appeared on Canada’s budget with dedicated funding, Axworthy (who holds a wider definition of human security) reports that Canada’s security council used the language and concept of human security regularly: “On the agenda were issues like protecting civilians in armed conflict, reforming sanctions regimes to mitigate negative humanitarian outcomes, bolstering the rights of women in places like Afghanistan, and the necessity of humanitarian intervention to protect against a future Rwanda or Srebrenica.” Conceptually, Canada’s interpretation of human security focuses on “freedom from pervasive threats to people’s rights, safety or lives” - the protection of civilians, conflict prevention, public safety, governance and accountability, and peace support operations. As Rob McRae summarized this interpretation, “At its most basic level, human security means freedom from fear.”

Canada’s conflict-focused reformulation of the human security term sets aside poverty reduction goals, but this narrow interpretation is defended, “because we believe this is where the concept of human security has the greatest value added – where it complements existing international agendas already focussed on promoting national security, human rights and human development.”

Norway likewise focuses on the freedom from fear aspects of human security, and identifies a core agenda of preventive action, small arms and light weapons control, and peace operations. Both nations found human security, with its emphasis on protecting individuals, to be useful in highlighting new and necessary aspects of security from violent opposition. They thus founded the Human Security Network (otherwise known as the Lysøen Group), whose annual meetings attract NGOs and governmental actors from about 13 countries, including Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand. They have mobilized around practical responses to human security threats. The topics of their actions include “protection for civilians,” “landmines treaty,” a “permanent international criminal court,” children’s issues (the optional protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on minimum ages for recruitment and deployment of soldiers), “small arms and light weapons,” and “drug trafficking and organized crime networks.”

Japan maintains the broadest definition of human security, which “comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten human survival, daily life and dignity... and strengthens efforts to confront these threats.” Particularly, Japan does not prioritize “freedom from fear” over the “freedom from want”, but holds them as dual objectives of human security. According to Japan’s “blue book,” Japan emphasizes “Human Security” from the perspective of strengthening efforts to cope with threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity such as poverty, environmental degradation, illicit drugs, transnational organized crime, infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, the outflow of refugees and anti-personnel landmines, and has taken various initiatives in this context. To ensure ‘Human freedom and potential,’ a range of issues needs to be addressed from the perspective of ‘Human Security,’ focussed on the individual, and requiring cooperation among the various actors in the international community, including governments, international organizations and civil society.” Japan’s Human Security emphasis has found leadership in the highest levels of government, and supports both development-related activities and peace-related activities.

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59 Axworthy in McRae and Hubert, Eds. 2001:5. Hampson et al. 2002 also associate the human security agenda with the establishment of the international criminal court, and the (as of yet failed) initiative to control small arms that began immediately after the Ottawa Convention.
60 Axworthy has written for example that “At minimum, human security requires that basic needs are met” 1997:184
61 McRae and Hubert 2001:6
62 McRae and Hubert 2001:15
63 Canada DFAIT 2000:3
64 Lodgaard, 2001
65 Japan 1999
66 Acharya 2001 documents this and also notes that “the ‘human need’ aspect of human security has been especially salient in the Asia Pacific context in the aftermath of the regional economic crisis.” 2001:448.
Other countries have undertaken significant actions that safeguard human security, such as Thailand working to protect citizens in Burma, and South Africa sending battalions to the Congo and to Burundi. In each case, the operationalization of human security reflects the particular context of operation.

3.9 Critical Voices

The human security agenda naturally has received considered criticism on a number of grounds, both from participants in the enterprise of developing human security, and from those writing in strategic studies or security studies.

One of these is vagueness. Roland Paris, who reviews some of the sceptical literature, writes, “Human security is like ‘sustainable development’ – everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means. Existing definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of competing policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be studied.”67 The vagueness has a further complication in that it may also have positive value, by holding together an otherwise disparate coalition of interests.

Another criticism is incoherence. Buzan Weaver and de Wilde, who review criticisms of “wide approaches” (not necessarily human security) from traditional security literature, find this to be one of the two main criticisms. Paris complains about those who seek to narrow human security but do so in an arbitrary way, without providing “a compelling rationale for highlighting certain values.”68

A third criticism is arbitrariness. When the potential set of critical and pervasive threats is so wide, by what criteria is a small subset of these chosen for consideration? So often the importance of a particular human security threat is argued in isolation from other threats, or threats appear to be chosen arbitrarily or in response to the interests of those responsible. It seems that the criteria of selection could include a wide range of considerations. Some are predictive: the probability of a threat occurring, the extent and depth of insecurity that is likely to result, and the duration of it. Some are perceptive: what human insecurities do people feel most strongly about. Some are ethical: will threats further exacerbate Some are simply pragmatic: what is the relative cost of preventing threats; how feasible is it that prevention will be successful.

Most often, human security is considered to be straightforwardly too wide to use. As Lawrence Freedman wrote: “Once anything that generates anxiety or threatens the quality of life in some respects becomes labelled a ‘security problem,’ the field risks losing all focus.”69 This feasibility concern is widely shared and will be discussed in 5.1 below. For those coming from a state security approach the breadth of human security is difficult to ponder, and even narrower approaches to security are routinely dismissed.70

Several conclusions can be drawn from this brief review of human security concepts. First, the notion is under research and implementation in disparate circles. Second, operationalizations of human security necessarily narrow the conception from the 1994 description of it. The

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67 2001:88, see 95f
68 Paris 2001: 95
69 1998:53
70 In an article “Geopolitics Updated” Robert Art sketches seven possible national security strategies for the United States. He first observes that “Vital interests are those whose costs to the nation are somewhere between severe to catastrophic if not protected and whose benefits are large when protected.” (1998/1999:83). But he defines vital interests as “prevention of attack, invasion, conquest, or destruction of a state’s territory;” “deep peace” among Eurasian great powers (p 89) and “a secure supply of oil at stable prices.” The same author dismisses in a broad brush manner three infeasible strategies including collective and cooperative security. Human security does not make it into the discussion.
variety of narrower proposed definitions causes consternation on the part of some reflective readers, who might be forgiven if, surveying this fleet of definitions and institutionalizations, they called out, “would the Real Human Security please stand up?” But a more accurate way of interpreting the conceptual discussion might be to conclude that an adequate conception of human security must comprise not only a working definition of human security, but also an account of the process by which individual institutions or nations can adapt and operationalize the concept to a form that is relevant to their own institutional capabilities and cultural contexts. Third, although all writers surveyed consider human security to be multidimensional, the dimensions that they list differ, and the thresholds that must be met in order to assure security in any given dimension differ also. A concept of human security must include some account of the elements it contains, and of the process by which potential security claims in the various dimensions will be identified. The working definition introduced at the outset of this paper and further described below undertakes just that.

4. The Elements of Human Security

What, then, are the elements of Human Security? Should the set include the environment, health, education, and protection from natural disasters? Taken in isolation, this may not actually be the best question to start with, for two reasons. First, the relevant elements of human security will differ radically depending on the expertise, size, and capacity of the implementing institution, as well as on the activities that are being effectively undertaken by other institutions in the context. And second, identifying the elements of human security is as much a value judgement as it is an explorative exercise. Thus to identify an abstract set of “elements of human security” is useful only in conjunction with other questions regarding the institutional environment and the views of the people.

This being said, as we just saw, one of the common complaints about human security has been its vagueness; another has been its breadth; another has been its arbitrariness. This section will give an account of how elements or dimensions of human security can be coherently identified, and the different kinds of reflection, consultation, research, and judgment that underlie this process. It further develops the working definition of human security and its component concepts that were introduced at the outset of this paper. According to that working definition, the objective of human security is to safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, without impeding long-term human fulfilment.

4.1 The Focal Point: Consensus? Threats?

What should be the epistemological basis of a concept of human security? One logical possibility is consensus among the institutions concerned, given that any adequate human security operation will involve the consensus and cooperation of diverse institutions. Furthermore this request does not seem, on the face of it, unreasonable. Most approaches to addressing destitution whether of refugee populations or of poor communities have included food security, for example. The human rights conventions on the one hand, and the international development targets on the other, represent the possibilities of reaching some “overlapping consensus”. As Sen writes, “Some functionings are very elementary, such as being adequately nourished, being in good health, etc., and these may be strongly valued by all, for obvious reasons.”

But universal agreement seems less plausible: some may think all who do not hold a particular set of religious beliefs to be “existentially insecure” and those who believe them to be “flourishing,” regardless of their material state, for example. The history of human rights in practice illustrates that the existence of a formal international accord is not equivalent to actual

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international accord; the human rights debate continues within and among nations that have ratified various documents. Certainly consensus is an insufficient foundation for human security, although clearly consensus-building will in practice be an integral part of the human security process.\textsuperscript{74}

Another way to conceptualize human security is to “name the threats” for which responses must be developed. In this view, the elements of human security would be itemised as threats of recession, of aggression, of soil degradation, of pollution, of terrorism, and others that were of sufficient magnitude to qualify as security threats. In fact, it is precisely this very fruitful and necessary exercise that catalyzed the broadening of the state security agenda. Ullman’s influential article, “Redefining Security,” began by defining a threat to national security as:

an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or (2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state.\textsuperscript{75}

Ullman argued that in addition to military threats, events such as population growth, urbanization, and migration should be considered as new security threats because they fit the definition. Human security authors often seem attracted to this route, and proceed by identifying threats – on the assumption that readers will acknowledge the importance and urgency of these threats – before presenting the shape of the human security agenda.

The focus on threats is almost a sufficient conceptual basis for human security, but it leaves unspecified a key area: the fundamental grounds by which threats are identified. If you describe to your barber the health challenges facing the families of Malawi because of the epidemic, and he exclaims that these things “must be addressed,” then a considerable body of conceptual communication has passed between you. In particular, you have not only described the relevant threats, you have also implicitly asked him whether he agrees with you that they are indeed threats; that is, that they endanger something of value in him or, in this case, other people. He presumes to know enough of these others (probably based on his own qualification of also being a human being) to know that they will object. Furthermore, in raising his adamant call to action, he is judging that this threat is important, unjust, and unacceptable. The natural interpretation would be that the epidemic is unjust or unacceptable precisely because (he assumes) something central, necessary, important, and valuable to the people affected is endangered. Implicit, then, in your swift moral transaction with your barber was a whole set of assumptions regarding what the people of Malawi valued and needed at a very basic level. A concept of human security that focused only on threats would leave these subterranean assumptions unexplored. It does so to its peril.

For example, your barber may well provide the same call for action even if you elaborate that the challenge is an epidemic of vegetarianism. But does a culinary fashion threaten human security? You might naturally switch the back to the “vital core” and ask your barber: What kinds of impacts on human lives would be sufficiently grave to justify action? So a threat-identification exercise, although a central part of human security, is likewise an insufficient foundation for it.

4.2 The Vital Core

I argue instead that human security takes its shape from the human being: the vital core that is to be secured. The term “vital core” is not meant to be precise;\textsuperscript{76} it suggests a minimal or basic or fundamental set of functions related to survival, livelihood and dignity. The term “vital core” implies that the institutions that undertake to protect human security will not be able to protect every aspect of human well-being, but at very least they will protect this core.

\textsuperscript{74} Finnis 1998b
\textsuperscript{75} 1983:33
\textsuperscript{76} Although Art 1998/1999 for example distinguishes “vital” from “desirable” security interests.
While the identification of what is vital can and will be informed by medical or psychological research, as well as by consensus and awareness of threats, human security gains coherence when it specifies carefully what it is trying to protect. That is, the eventual elements of human security (or responses to human security threats) take their shape not from medical manuals or from committee conclusions but rather from people’s reflections, on the basis of their own experience and knowledge, of their values and needs. This basis and epistemological foundation may be called practical reason, and it has already been claimed as the foundation of human development and, in some cases, of human rights.\(^77\)

When this vital core is identified – and key questions will include whether the core is limited to physical survival or includes aspects of bodily integrity, dignity, political voice, and livelihood – then and only then can the subsequent “action-oriented” procedural questions emerge. A central such question is what are the key threats to human security – their nature, their probability, and possible responses. A second question is how, concretely, different institutions carve out their human security agendas; and how they protect human security in a globalised world where the “hierarchy of political processes … has broken down.”\(^78\) A third question is how should these threats and agendas be evaluated and reviewed? We address these topics below.

But first it may be well to acknowledge one characteristic that arises from a human-focused rather than a threat-focused concept of human security, and that is that some instances of human insecurity may be identified for which no immediate response is possible. A human-focused understanding of human security leaves open the possibility that “fears and needs” might be identified for which no institutional response exists – such as the fear of a woman going home to a situation of recurrent domestic violence from her husband. In this situation we might do well to consider the analogous position defended by Sen in regards to definitions of poverty: “the non-availability of public resources to help eliminate severe deprivations should not make us redefine poverty itself.”\(^79\)

4.3 Specifying the Vital Core: Capabilities and Rights

While the term “vital core” may have intuitive appeal, it is not a precise philosophical term. One attribute in its favour is that it is not linked to any literatures on safety, quality of life, fundamental human rights, absolute poverty, human needs or wants or related subjects that have been the subject of discussion and debate through the centuries. This attribute is an advantage, because the term ‘vital core’ is not yet claimed by any approach – which is important because human security does bridge a number of previous concepts. But it does not justify re-inventing the wheel by treating its own vagueness as mysterious or unexplored. This vital core may be specified in terms of human rights or capabilities related to absolute poverty. As there have been many discussions as to which rights are fundamental, or which deprivations constitute absolute poverty, the human security agenda should benefit from and build upon these.\(^80\)

One powerful and thorough articulation of this space is the capability approach which similarly re-orients the objective of economic activity from an instrumental end (economic growth) to a people-centred end (expanding people’s freedom).\(^81\) Capabilities are composed of the freedom to enjoy a set of various valuable “beings and doings,” such as being nourished, being confident, being able to walk about without terror, being able to wear what you’d like, having a

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\(^78\) Rothschild 1995:85

\(^79\) 1992:108 That section continues: “One can argue that the first step is to diagnose deprivation, and related to that, to determine what we should do if we had the means. And then the next step is to make actual policy choices in line with our means.”

\(^80\) See Sen 1992, [HR ]

say in group decisions.\textsuperscript{82} This freedom is concerned with “the real opportunity that we have to accomplish what we value”\textsuperscript{83} and so includes both civil and political liberties, and positive economic, social, or cultural freedoms, such as the resources one needs to avoid malnourishment. What people value is rarely limited to their own well-being; it also may include “agency,” which is the freedom to bring about achievements one values.\textsuperscript{84} The UNDP Human Development Reports, which use the language of capabilities and functionings, describe the capability approach as “expanding people’s choices.” That definition is easily accessible although it is also open to some misinterpretation.\textsuperscript{85}

The implications of specifying capabilities as a coherent space in which to identify the elements and threshold of the “vital core” are several. First, as just mentioned, the capability approach solidifies human security’s central focus on human beings. Second, the capability approach raises the question of what people value. Third, the capability approach offers a basis not only for human security but also for “human flourishing” in general. Fourth, the capability approach has clear and significant relationships to human development and human rights literatures.

As may be evident already fundamental human rights and basic capabilities share the same basic terrain – which encompasses both political/civil and economic/cultural/social aspects. It is not necessary to choose between them.\textsuperscript{86} Each approach has distinctive strengths, which have been clearly elaborated elsewhere and will be mentioned in section five below.\textsuperscript{87} For example the human rights approach holds the notion of obligation and duty centrally, in a way that concepts of absolute poverty have not done. Furthermore, the human rights approach has long defended the plurality of human rights (successively elaborated in the Geneva Conventions and the Conventions on Genocide, on Refugees, on Women and Children for example), which economic approaches to poverty reduction adopted more recently (as embodied in common expressions such as “poverty is multidimensional,” for example). The capability approach and associated approaches to poverty reduction and human development have, while recognizing many things to be deeply important, directly addressed the necessary issues of prioritization. As Anand and Sen wrote, “Human rights advocates have often asserted the indivisibility and equal importance of human rights. This claim is certainly true if it is understood as denying that there is a hierarchy of different kinds of rights, but it cannot be denied that scarcity of resources and institutional constraints often require us to prioritize concern for securing different rights for the purposes of policy choice. Human development analysis helps us see this clearly and confront it directly.” In a similar manner, policies to provide human security would incorporate some implicit or explicit hierarchy.

The following section will explore how a focus on one rudimentary capability – in this case the freedom from premature preventable death – affects the desired orientation of human security

\textsuperscript{82} Functionings are certainly related to what people “want” or “desire” or “need” or “aspire to” and to “psychic utility”. But the problem with focusing only on wants or on utility is that these psychological states are quite malleable and can adapt to situations of grave danger and deprivation (or be manipulated by political interests). A widow who lives in the midst of a high crime inner city may be serene and even happy, while a wealthy and well-connected businesswoman may be terribly dissatisfied. Functionings are also related to what people “have” such as money or access to food or small arms and other commodities. But these are also incomplete because they do not account for people’s diversity: a big strapping teenager needs a great deal more food a day than does his grandmother.


\textsuperscript{85} The emphasis in the Human Development school on “expanding people’s choices,” an emphasis that arises from Sen’s capability approach, may appear to ignore the fact that some people and groups value personal autonomy and free choice far more than others. Sen recognizes that more choices may not mean more freedom, in part because available choices may not be ones we value, and in part because (however valuable or not our options may be) we may lose the option to live “a peaceful and unbothered life.” (1992:63) Furthermore, freedom of choice is distinct from control. For example, if, given the choice, we would choose to live in a malaria-free environment, then ceteris paribus a public program to drain malaria ponds does indeed enhance our freedom, even if we were not in fact asked, because in the absence of this public program we would not have the effective freedom to live in a malaria-free environment. So the emphasis on ‘choice’ is both qualified and flexible.


\textsuperscript{87} See Anand and Sen 2000, which is the draft for UNDP 2000: chapters 1 and 2.
to the person, and also unites the concerns regarding “freedom from fear and freedom from want.” Of course human security also includes other capabilities and rights, but much can be learned by exploring this one. The next section after that will explore a range of wider positions. It will propose that the “vital core” comprise very rudimentary rights or freedoms, which may be organized within the categories, survival (freedom from premature preventable death), daily life (basic material needs), and dignity.

4.4 One example of the vital core: the Freedom from Premature Preventable Death (Survival)

If a person asked herself why she locked the door at night; why she had her children vaccinated, why she and her family emigrated during the war, and asked this question again and again, she might arrive at the recognition that she undertook all of these actions in large part in order to enjoy physical survival, free from premature death. Survival is at its heart an indivisible value. Freedom from want and freedom from fear unite, in this interpretation, in freedom from premature death. Obviously death itself can not be eradicated, but many premature deaths might be – among them some of the 15 million persons who die of hunger-related causes every year.

What can we learn from studying this “right to survive” that is certainly at the heart of human security? A number of interesting insights emerge. First, by focusing on the human side of security (rather than the threat side), even in its narrowest connotation of freedom from premature preventable death, the traditional distinctions between death caused by violent war or terrorism or natural disaster, and death caused by economic collapse, lack of health care or social security structures, criminality, and environmental degradation, break down. The distinctive nexus of human security issues – poverty and conflict – emerges organically from the single value of physical security.

Second, it makes a difference that human security is framed in terms of freedom – the freedom from premature death – and not in terms of enforcing maximum lifespans. For people regularly put their lives at risk for a greater cause – be it mountain climbing and car racing, or serving in dangerous settings as fire-fighters or emergency relief workers, or any number of other activities. Their conscious, voluntary decision to undertake these risks means that whatever happens would not be attributable to a breach of human security. For this reason, the “vital core” is described in the language of freedom.

A third observation – to return to the problem of judging your child’s drama production – is that difficult value judgements are still necessary. What counts as “preventable”? For example motor vehicle accidents are a leading cause of death; should speed limits worldwide therefore be set at 30 mph? How should limited research resources be allocated among different deep threats to human survival that are as wide-ranging as HIV-AIDS, electronic terrorism, global warming, nuclear proliferation, and stock market crashes? The clear identification even of one central element of human security – the freedom from premature preventable death – does not solve all vexing value judgements.

Fourth, if one takes a long-term view of building a world that secures people against premature death in a way that leads to their overall fulfilment, the justifiable means one might undertake to support survival are really rather broad. For example, primary education is one of the best means to health improvements; a free press is an essential institution for famine prevention; adequate management of water and energy resources is necessary both to survive and to prevent conflict. Human security entails assessments as to which means will best provide it, and these assessments may be far-ranging, contested and complex.

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88 This reflection on ‘why persons do what they do’ engages practical reason. John Finnis argues that by undertaking these sorts of reflections people can come to clarify what their basic values are in practice.
Obviously the “premature death” definition is only one aspect of human security. For there are many kinds of human insecurities that this focus would not include, such as freedom from non-lethal torture or beatings; freedom from chronic or even debilitating and painful but non-fatal health conditions; freedom from chronic hunger; freedom from imprisonment, rape, or imprisonment if one did not have the right faith, or did not dress properly, or painted or published or broadcast (or viewed, read, or listened to) the wrong things. It would not include freedom from slavery or freedom from apartheid or freedom from involuntary sterilization. But what rights, what dimensions of poverty, will human security include, and how will human security avoid the charges that both human rights and human development have likewise faced of being too broad?

4.5 Multidimensional Human Security

The task of carving out a certain subset of material and political needs around which to form a consensus for concerted action, has a distinguished history, to which philosophers, health specialists, political theorists, lawyers, psychologists, statisticians and economists have all contributed.

One conceptual strength of “building in” other dimensions of human life as ends of human security is that the approach recognizes their intrinsic importance. There is something awry if one must justify primary health or protection from torture solely on the grounds that doing so is instrumental to survival (or conversely, justify poverty reduction on the grounds doing so is instrumental to conflict prevention). For part of the reason – although not the only reason – that people may promote bodily integrity or education is that these functionings are intrinsically valuable. A conceptual framework that does not have room to recognize multiple intrinsic values is in some way incomplete.

But many people’s instinctive response to broadening the objective, whether it be of national security or of economic development, is one of mistrust or anxiety. Their anxiety does not arise from the accuracy of the objective. Rather, they worry that broadening the objective deeply compromises its feasibility. If the door is cracked, then many competing demands will come rushing in, and these demands will change continuously, as will people’s own values. In such circumstances not only will decision-making be agonizing, it will also be very difficult to run a program with the kind of power and effectiveness that characterises some national security initiatives and that must likewise characterize human security initiatives if they are to be worthwhile. The attraction of a narrow definition arises from the presumption that the number of conceptual elements in a definition corresponds to the breadth of the definition. When the channel is narrow, then the water will run swiftly and gain an incredible amount of energy and power that can be harnessed for important activities; if the channel is wide or if there are many tiny channels, then the water runs slowly and its energy is dissipated.

The tension between feasibility and breadth is likely to be ongoing in discussions about human security, even if human security is understood to comprise survival, livelihood, and basic dignity as Prime Minister Obuchi proposed it should.

The working definition does not specify the elements of the vital core that would be relevant in all contexts and times because no specific list could exist. Instead, the vital core refers to that subset of human capabilities that people judge should be protected even in times of turmoil or want. These are, we propose, capabilities related to survival, livelihood, and dignity. In general, human security should set very rudimentary thresholds in any of these dimension. Yet the

91 The criticisms of wider approaches to human security in the national security literature regularly express this reservation, as do criticisms of the ineffectiveness and cost of certain United Nations undertakings.
dimensions of this core, and the threshold of what is vital and what is not, are open to ongoing discussion. This means that operationalization of human security – whether in core standards for transnational corporations, in a human security index, in a local government’s flood protection program, or elsewhere – will always require specification.

This concludes the section on the normative working definition of human security but does not, it is hoped, conclude discussion of it. The discussion should be continuous, even though policies will identify concrete priorities within certain time periods – e.g. that Country X’s development cooperation in 2004-2008 will be primarily concerned with Y, or that its national security strategy will focus on Z. Discussion should not paralyse policy, but policy should be reviewed regularly. The principles and grounds for choice in the operationalization of the concept lie largely outside the scope of this paper, although they have been addressed thoroughly in discussions such as participation, of governance, of outcome orientation, of monitoring and evaluation systems, of sustainability, of social inclusion practices, and so on. The following two sections introduce two of the many kinds of procedural considerations that will be needed to translate a normative definition into an appropriate application.

4.6 Critical and Pervasive Threats

The objective of human security is to protect the vital core of people’s lives from critical and pervasive threats. So a further step is to identify critical and pervasive threats to the vital core of people’s lives, and to identify key response mechanisms. In other words, we must sift the vast series of adverse events in human life to determine which are unacceptable, or are “threats” to human security, and which are merely bad news. Of course, this is no straightforward task: the West did not foresee the Velvet Revolutions, and futurist strategic scenarios range wildly from a world fighting terrorism, to a world simmering with multiple civil wars and water fights, to a world with China or Japan rising as the next superpower, to a world huddled together without energy or water.92

The catalogue of threats to human security is often recited at length, as a means to motivate listeners as to the importance of the issues at hand. However, a simple litany of threats offers very little strategic information. This section identifies various useful distinctions in risk and threat analysis: direct vs. indirect threats, and idiosyncratic vs. covariant risks.

Direct security threats are deliberately or intentionally caused by one group or another, whether these be terrorists, states, rebel factions, or paramilitary groups. Organs of the state may themselves threaten human security, such as police forces that violate human rights by beating or torturing prisoners. Direct threats are frequently associated with violence, although they can also take other forms, such as deliberate policies of social or economic exclusion. They are acts of commission.

Indirect or structural threats are actions by groups or systems or institutions whose threat to human security is a by-product of an action taken for a different primary purpose. Examples abound: an economic crisis may cause a large proportion of the population to experience deprivation; mining or forestry policy may have dark environmental consequences that erode communities’ subsistence; favouritism by political leaders may generate destabilizing horizontal inequalities or social exclusion; negligence in effective demobilization of soldiers may cause a rise in violent crime; the vigorous marketing of small arms by manufacturers may destabilize a region.93 Indirect threats require distinct strategic responses, and in particular attend to the unintended (but often predictable) consequences of actions: “What lies behind the unhappiness of some smaller states with the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, is a plea to consider more carefully the micro impact of

92 Gaddis in Lynn-Jones and Miller 1993.
93 Often these threats have been classified as institutional or structural violence, or even “structural sin” – the term favored by liberation theologians.Curtin and Litke 1999, Gutierrez 1973, Tow et al.2000 identify this concern with structural violence as one of the three central features of human security, p 19.
international policies and agreements on the human security of their citizens.\footnote{Sen 1999a: 255f; McRae in McRae and Hubert 2001. Examples of World Bank instruments that do attempt to foresee and mitigate the undesirable impacts of Bank-supported policies and projects include Environmental and Social Impact Assessments, and Bank Operational Policies relating to Resettlement or Indigenous peoples. See Cernea and McDowell 2000} Indirect threats might be thought of as acts of \textit{omission}.\footnote{See Dréze and Sen 1995:21, Sen 1999 Ch 11. In certain legal and moral approaches, acts of omission are as culpable as acts of commission...}

Another set of useful terms for locating the appropriate institutional response to threats is the distinction between idiosyncratic and covariant risks. \textit{Idiosyncratic} risks affect individuals or households: a debilitating illness or injury of key adults in the household; the loss of property from crime or an accident. \textit{Covariant} risks affect groups – whether small groups such as communities (meso), or large regional or national groups (macro). Examples of meso risks are riots, landslides, harvest failure, or deforestation. Examples of macro risks are coup d’états, hyperinflation, terms of trade shock, civil strife, war, earthquakes.\footnote{World Bank 2000/1:136} The distinction is of direct relevance to response mechanisms: if crop insurance is set up at the village level and all of the village crops fail one season, then the “insurance” has not provided an adequate protection because it was set up at too narrow a level.

The strategies for dealing with direct versus indirect, or covariant versus idiosyncratic threats are often distinct, and the habit of recognizing not only the threat but also the source of the threat or threatener is part of the information needed for building a response strategy.

4.7 Institutional Appropriateness

A second procedural issue is how human security relates to existing institutions and organizations (many of which support human security already), and how to identify what institutional structures must be created.

As was discussed at the outset of the discussion there are two broad approaches institutions can take to human security. The first is the direct \textit{provision of human security}. The strategies that are associated with human security aim to identify the threats and then seek to prevent threats from materializing, mitigate harmful effects if threats eventuate, and help victims cope. Governments have the responsibility and authority to provide human security to their citizens. In many instances, local or international agents also undertake particular responsibilities. For example, national governments may have a responsibility to invest adequately in their primary health care sector; the United Nations may undertake a responsibility to protect civilians during violent conflict.

The second strategic approach to human security protection is \textit{respect}. Respect for human security means that \textit{whatever their primary objective may be}, all actors, whether institutional or individual, must ascertain that their actions do not foreseeably albeit unintentionally, threaten human security. For example, certain active processes to respect environmental integrity, and certain types of research into the foreseeable, even if “unintended” consequences of a transnational corporation’s project such as a pipeline (perhaps resulting in resettlement that causes severe deprivation) are essential. To take another example, if a structural adjustment policy package regularly and predictably catapults populations into poverty without setting up safety nets, \textit{the policy package does not respect human security} – even if these side effects are utterly unintentional. This is quite demanding, although it has already been taken up in various impact assessment procedures (environmental, social) as well as in some ethical codes. Respect for human security entails research or investigation; it is active, not passive; it requires time and resources. Ensuring respect for human security is likely to require formal or informal enforcement mechanisms, such as documenting or protesting incidences of disrespect, or enforcing impact assessments and business codes of conduct.
A further institutional conundrum is the question of which institution is responsible for human security and has the authority to provide it. The principle of subsidiarity was articulated by German Jesuits in order to try to protect workers from alienating labour conditions in which they could not exercise their own creativity or initiative. Its original intention, like that of human development, was to protect people’s freedom and self-direction. It holds that the most appropriate agent capable of making a choice or undertaking a responsibility should do so. The essential insight of this principle is that maximal responsibility should be assumed by the most local or specialized organizations that are capable of undertaking it. In this way the freedom of local organizations is best preserved, while large institutions siphon off needs which cannot be addressed by smaller or weaker groups, or where there are significant economies of scale. But with the increase in civil tensions and conflicts, the geographically “most local” instrument of government is often one of the primary actors that perpetuates human insecurity. Thus those who are capable of providing human security may be external or international actors.

The mention of subsidiarity effectively introduces the array of procedural concerns — ranging from authority to efficiency to justice to sustainability to empowerment to feasibility — that go well beyond the scope of this discussion, but that will directly influence — how — and how well — human security is operationalized.

5. Human Security and other Policy Frameworks: Coherence and Distinctions

The final challenge of this paper is to address the charge that the concept of human security overpopulates an area that is already adequately addressed by state security, human development, and human rights initiatives, causing needless confusion and competing for scarce resources. Of course there are interrelationships between all of these concepts. However, each of the three sections below will situate the concept of human security in relationship to state security, human development, and human rights.

There are various non-conceptual ways of distinguishing these three approaches: disciplinary, historical, and institutional. For example, whereas human development tends to be undertaken by activists and social scientists, and human rights by activists and lawyers and political scientists, state security studies described practitioners and scholars of defence and strategic studies, intelligence, and international relations. The disciplines that predominate in any of the areas shape the expertise and method of scholarship devoted to an area. Furthermore, the instruments and institutions that support each agenda differ: human development involves non-governmental development organizations, sector-specific agencies in governments, overseas development assistance. Human rights mobilizes the international legal framework, UN Conventions, human rights organisations and legal instruments. State security mobilizes foreign policy, military expenditures, and defence and intelligence departments. These distinctions are key, and indeed one of the distinctions of human security from each of the other three approaches will be the unique blend of disciplines and institutions it engages. However the section below restricts discussion to conceptual differences between different policy frameworks.

5.1 Human Security and State Security

It is quite important to work out carefully the relationship between human security and state security. One key reason is that the United Nations “existing organizational mandates and mechanisms draw heavily from state security assumptions.” Another key reason is that

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97 The principle was formulated earlier this century to insist “that people should not be absorbed into giant enterprises in which they are mere cogs without opportunity to act on their own initiative.” Finnis 1983:38-39.

98 For example Anand and Sen discuss the interrelationship between human rights and human development that informs the account below (reprinted in UNDP 2000 Chapter 1).

99 Ogata 2001b:4. The paragraph continues, “The United Nations Charter states its objective as the maintenance of “international peace and security,” and obliges all members to “take collective measures for the prevention and
collaboration with state security forces would be essential to human security at the national level. Also grave threats to state security evoke well-funded, emphatic, expert responses. In the face of security threats, groups that otherwise differ on many niceties will rally and support joint action. And nations regularly invest considerable resources in anticipation of security threats, which range from the doctoral research of engineers to the daily callisthenics that maintain the musculature of army troops. As a result, state security issues are associated in many minds with effective response mechanisms. These characteristics of funding, research, consensus, efficacy, and “get-to-the-bottom-of-the-matter” attention are also necessary to confront the grave threats to human security.\textsuperscript{100}

Furthermore, human security may be a timely extension of the state security framework, one which explores and develops the newer issues that are already on the edges of the security agenda, and brings outside expertise to bear on issues that already have the attention and concern of national security advisors.\textsuperscript{101} In the 1999 edition of the textbook \textit{American National Security} used at West Point and Georgetown Universities, among others, Jordan Taylor and Mazaar define national security narrowly as “protection of the nation’s people and territories against physical assault.” Yet even in this narrow definition, “National Security … has a more extensive meaning than protection from physical harm; it also implies protection, through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten the fundamental values and vitality of the state.”\textsuperscript{102}

More recently, the 2001 report of the Hart-Rudman Commission on U.S. National Security not only advocates investment in education as part of the national security strategy,\textsuperscript{103} but also relates the material well-being of those living outside the boundaries of the United States to U.S. national security:

\begin{quote}
the United States should pursue, within the limits of what is prudent and realistic, the worldwide expansion of material abundance and the eradication of poverty. It should also promote political pluralism, freedom of thought and speech, and individual liberty. Not only do such aims inhere in American principles, they are practical goals as well. There are no guarantees against violence and evil in the world. We believe, nonetheless, that the expansion of human rights and basic material well-being constitutes a sturdy bulwark against them.\textsuperscript{104}
\end{quote}

The broadening scope of state security has also been reflected in the emergence of terms such as “common,” and “collective” and “global” to modify “security.” \textit{Common Security} was defined by the Common Security Forum\textsuperscript{105} as “inclusive of but extending beyond the human dimensions of military conflict – incorporating health and population dimensions of political, ethnic, economic and environmental security as well.”\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Collective Security}, such as is envisaged in

\textsuperscript{100} This attempt for wider notions of security to capture resources and attention has been much commented upon both positively and negatively. See the summary in Florini and Simmons 1998 and also see Rothschild 1995.


\textsuperscript{102} The Clinton Administration’s \textit{National Security Strategy} 1996 likewise advocated ‘Promoting Democracy Abroad’ (White House 1996:1, 32-35) as one of three pillars, and also had a role for ‘Promoting Sustainable Development Abroad’ (White House 1996:26, 30-32. The Hart-Rudman approach is of course disputed; see Roxborough 2001; the ‘Gilmore Report’ 2000, representing an alternative set of recommendations on U.S. National Security configurations, does not reflect any interest in the human security of non-Americans.

\textsuperscript{103} The Hart-Rudman approach is of course disputed; see Roxborough 2001; the ‘Gilmore Report’ 2000, representing an alternative set of recommendations on U.S. National Security configurations, does not reflect any interest in the human security of non-Americans.

\textsuperscript{104} The Common Security Forum was set up in 1992 to build upon the work of the Palme Commission, and has involved research centres in the UK, US, India, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Russia, and Sweden.

the United Nations Charter, “refers to a system in which each state in the system accepts that the security of one is the concern of all, and agrees to join in a collective response to aggression.”\(^{107}\) The Commission on Global Governance likewise argues that “Global security must be broadened from its traditional focus on the security of states to include the security of people and the planet.”\(^{108}\)

These examples of a broader agenda within security studies are not isolated incidents. A survey of the past 25 years of articles in the “most frequently cited journal in international relations,”\(^{109}\) International Security, identifies three changes. The first is that many more “fundamental” issues are on the agenda about the various possible security configurations. For example, would a collective security system be feasible or desirable or is this a period of transition to a situation of rivalry between a different set of powers.\(^{110}\) The agenda of human security likewise raises fundamental issues about the international order, both because some global threats to human security may best be addressed by international institutions, and because security concerns are also being undertaken by NGOs and by local and regional groups. The second change is that security studies has “a fresh and full agenda.” The agenda is less Eurocentric, and the instruments under discussion are broader. This contested but observable widening brings the national security literature itself closer to human security.\(^{111}\) Finally, it is “a more scholarly agenda.” This reflects the increasing need for a strong conceptual framework and a clear methodology in order to manage effectively the increase in relevant institutions and in security agendas – a need that is shared in human security. The ongoing developments of conceptions of national security clearly overlap with the human security agenda.

There are also key differences between state and human security. One regards an issue of presentation or of substance in the human security agenda. As Tow et al. describe the situation, “Traditionalists … have little patience with those who would dilute the established field of security studies by overloading it with an ambitious agenda of problems and issues that would compromise the analytical power of their critical ideas… Human security advocates are cast as offering the promise of a new, more co-operative, but perhaps unattainable and unrealistic international order.”\(^{112}\) One writer went so far as to associate human security with liberals who believe “human nature is essentially good and peace loving.”\(^{113}\) To many in national security, it seems that human security lies at the outer edge of liberal internationalism, remote in relevance, ideal rather than reliable, and undisciplined by the burden of accountability and responsibility that national security advisors regularly shoulder. This is not a position of influence. Those who promote human security might do well to mind first impressions.

A key conceptual difference between state security and human security is the populations under consideration. State agencies by definition have a different responsibility to the citizenry than they do to international populations at large. This difference is by no means a deficiency. Yet it does require clarity of the grounds for obligation to citizens outside the nation-state. One set of possible justifications is that implied in the Hart-Rudman document: that “the expansion of human rights and basic material well-being constitutes a sturdy bulwark against [violence and evil].” That is, protecting others’ human security strengthens the security of national populations and thus would be in the self-interest of the nation-state, because it would be significantly less costly than countering violence or terrorism. The problem with this logic of

\(^{107}\) Roberts 2000:30. Roberts acknowledges that collective security does not date only to the League of Nations but “was aired for instance at the negotiations which led to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia” 2000:30. See also Hurrell 1992, Rothschild 1995.

\(^{108}\) 1995:78f

\(^{109}\) According to the Institute for Scientific Information in Journal Citation Reports, International security has had this status since 1995.

\(^{110}\) Quoted with footnotes from 2000:27

\(^{111}\) The widening agenda is much discussed: roadmaps of these discussions can be found in Gasteyger 1999, Florini and Simmons 1998, Buzan.

\(^{112}\) Tow Thakur and Hyun 2000:14

\(^{113}\) Kim and Hyun in Tow et al, at p 35
course is that interest in human security might swiftly cease if more cost-effective terrorism prevention mechanisms were discovered. A more durable justification would be that all nations have an imperfect obligation to address breaches of human security. The case for responsibility for non-citizens must be made to state entities (as well as to individuals and groups within states), and it matters how it is made.

Second, state security has at least one additional objective that is distinct from human security. For a characteristic aim of foreign policy in the realist theory, which is also a de facto aim in many nations, is to maximize the state’s power. Thus national security is also substantially concerned with the relative distribution of power between states, and with territorial integrity. That concern is legitimate and lively worldwide. However, it is not part of the human security agenda. In theory, the human security agenda could be realized even if American dominance disappeared, and the world saw the ascendance of India or South Africa or Iran or France as major economic or military counterweights. So long as human beings enjoyed security of their core vital functions in a way that was consistent with their long-term fulfillment, the human security agenda could be said to be complete.

A core edge of disagreement between human security and state security comes when these two agendas are said to compete. Clearly the debate about intervention and “responsible sovereignty” identifies an area where views differ deeply. But certain conceptions of state security can also undermine human security. In a 2001 book called The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, realist John Mearsheimer defends what he calls “offensive realism,” which focuses centrally on the distribution of world power and legitimizes actions that are counter to human security (a term he does not use) if they increase national power. For example, Mearsheimer argues that China is the key contender for power vis-à-vis the United States, and thus argues, controversially, that United States policy towards China should attempt to dampen its economic growth, not to support China’s material and democratic development. A similar argument might have been made for the Iraq war. The dissonance between this extreme form of realism and human security is not terribly obscure.

In summary, human security proponents too rarely engage the various schools of security studies. For example, the realist and neo-realist schools of security studies clearly articulate their objectives as well as their postulates or simplifying assumptions (for example regarding motivation). Thus far human security literature has focused nearly exclusively on articulating the “objective,” or agenda; it has not delved into questions of motivation, or of simplifying assumptions, or of the economic competition that will proceed simultaneously between actors who may be cooperating in human security matters. Articulating the human security approach

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114 There are various ways of dissecting security agendas. For example, see Mead 2001, Art 1998/1999.
115 Ogata 2001b
116 Similarly Mastanduno finds that in practice America has often protected its economic interests even when these endanger security concerns. In Brown et al. 1997:123-162. To take another example, an entire literature has arisen in the United States about alternative national security strategies after the Cold War, which includes a vocal cadre of isolationist voices. For example, Eugene Gholz, Daryl Press, and Harvey Sapolsky make the case for an isolationist grand strategy that would cut defense spending to half the 1997 level but invest the “peace dividend” in the internal economy, and Christopher Layne argues that the US should cease not only exporting democracy but also participating in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions. [Both in Brown et al. 1997:200-243 and 244-282, respectively. See also Mead 2001, Mearsheimer 2001, Lynn-Jones and Miller 1993 (an earlier edited volume of International Security with a similar theme)]. These authors do not judge there to be sufficient empirical evidence that investment in human security (a term which has not entered these debates) is in the self-interest of the United States. The failure of most human security proponents even to acknowledge this central set of national concerns does little to open the dialogue.
117 Many clear accounts of the principles of realism exist – for example Morgenthau 1978:4-15. Lynn-Jones and Miller identify six characteristics of realism in current debates to be: 1) States are most important actors; 2) Anarchy – absence of any common sovereign – is the distinguishing feature of international life; 3) States maximize own power or security (power may be a means to security); 4) Realists assume states adopt rational policies to that aim; 5) States tend to rely on threat of military force to secure objectives; and 6) Distribution of power among states is key to international politics and foreign policy.
in a way that recognizes legitimate and distinct spheres of interest such as the distribution of power, or economic competitiveness, will strengthen it considerably.

5.2 Human Security and Human Development

The concept of human development refers to the broad approach to expanding people’s choices or capabilities not only in terms of income, but also in areas such as health, education, technology, the environment, employment. The human development school, which Haq called the ‘most holistic’ of all development approaches, emerged in the 1990s, building on a series of previous reactions against the dominant paradigm of economic development, which took economic growth maximization as its objective. Growth, it was argued, was insufficient as an objective, since aggregate growth could be realized alongside less desirable states such as wrenching deprivation among the poor, political oppression, or environmental degradation. The route of alternatives to economic growth as the standardbearer of development has a forceful history of more than thirty years. Dudley Seers announced the overthrow of GNP per capita as a measure of development in 1970. Hollis Chenery et al. emphasized the need for redistribution with growth, or growth with equity, accomplished by increasing the productivity of the poor. The basic needs approach arose subsequently, which endeavored to provide a minimally decent life to the poor, where constituents of this minimally decent life included health, housing, literacy, work, and so on.\(^\text{118}\)

The goals of human development, which evolved out of the basic human needs approach, were general and could apply to any country, regardless of where it lay on the spectrum of wealth or poverty, of crime or stability, of peace or war. Human development clearly holds that socio-economic policies should focus on people and their well-being as the final objective, rather than focusing on economic growth or any other state of affairs as ends in themselves. While the Human Development Index, which is a well-known by-product of this approach, explicitly includes health and education as well as income, the human development approach is not limited to these sectors but rather focuses on human choice and freedom per se. “Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices. Enlarging people’s choices is achieved by expanding human capabilities and functionings.”\(^\text{119}\)

The change from development aimed at relieving material poverty and providing for basic needs to development aimed at “giving people choices” also came about in response of the impetus to highlight the importance of dignity, esteem and other non-material aspects of life. “Contrary to Maslow’s theory of a hierarchy of wants, even people who are deprived of very basic physiological needs do consume non-basic goods and services.”\(^\text{120}\) Indeed some non-material values (such as cultural practice or identity) seem at times to displace basic needs (such as housing) altogether. Goulet gives the example of Sahara Bedouins, who look with scorn upon those who have too much tying them down to be able to move at will.

In practice, work inspired by the human development approach has been undertaken both at the policy level and at the level of the community, by NGOs, by UN agencies, by academics, and by other development institutions. The ‘content’ of the human development approach – its multidimensionality and its focus on choice-giving – is however not always referred to as human development. The World Bank terms its multidimensional and participatory work poverty reduction or empowerment (the term human development refers, within that institution, to activities in the sectors of health and education). But I will use the concept of human development sketched by the UNDP, and compare it with human security.

\(^{118}\) Streeten et al 1981.  
\(^{119}\) UNDP 1998:14 See also Sen 1999  
\(^{120}\) Stewart, 1985.
Given this thumbnail sketch of human development, it may now be evident that human development and human security share four fundamental perspectives\(^1\): they are people-centred; they are multi-dimensional; they have broad views on human fulfilment in the long term; and they address chronic poverty.

First, human security and human development are both people-centred. Both understand people to be “ends” and not means. This emphasis has led both to challenge dominant paradigms that take instrumental or technical achievements (national security, economic growth) as an end or objective, because these technical achievements may go alongside deeply undesirable states of affairs. Furthermore, the dominant paradigms do not have a role for ‘bottom-up’ human agency (and understanding people as ends means understanding them not only as objects but also as agents). In both cases, criticism of the dominant paradigm has been far from uncontroversial. While the logic (of ‘people-centred-ness’) may seem simplistic, in both the development community and the security community, the struggle to communicate the relevance, practicality, and importance of looking beyond purely instrumental or technical considerations, has been considerable and is ongoing.

Second, both human development and human security are multi-sectoral and multidimensional undertakings. Both address people’s dignity as well as their material and physical concerns. The measures of success go beyond income and preparedness. This breadth complicates the approaches, and makes priority-setting a key concern. At the same time, because the task of discussing and setting priorities (amid disagreement) forms an explicit part of the human security and human development approaches, both approaches are able to adapt constantly to new scenarios and new threats.

Third, human development provides the “broad picture” long-term objective of human fulfilment within any society, whether it is rich or whether it is poor; whether composed of refugees or artisans or farmers. This broad objective is shared by human security although the human security approach pursues a narrower agenda. In fact the phrase “in a manner that is consistent with long term human fulfilment” that appears in the working definition of human security could be rephrased as ‘in a manner that is consistent with long-term human development.’

Fourth, human development and human security both address chronic poverty. That is, human development is a broad approach that is relevant for rich and for poor persons and communities. But when the human development approach is applied to impoverished persons who already live with chronic insecurity of food or health or livelihood, it overlaps with and may be indistinguishable from human security. For this subset of persons – the chronic poor/insecure – human security and human development processes (which include participation) are likely to identify and prioritise the same capabilities. And the same types of policy recommendations, such as girls’ education, freedom of the press, and preventative health care, are likely to emerge.

There are also some differences between human security and human development. The first difference between human security and human development is the strictly delimited nature of human security. The “vital core” that defines human security is comprised of a subset of basic capabilities. The goal of human security is not expansion of all capabilities in an open-ended fashion, but rather the provision of vital capabilities to all persons equally. Human development in contrast is more extensive and includes concerns that are clearly not basic. Human security includes a strictly delimited subset of human development concerns (as well as other concerns for ‘downturn’ that human development has not emphasised), but it also excludes much of human development as lying outside of its own mandate.

The second difference is that the human security paradigm undertakes to address threats such as violence or economic downturn directly. It recognizes that wars are a real possibility – be

\(^1\) Sen 2000 sketches the relationship between human security, human development, and human rights.
they civil or international – and thus that deliberate investment in conflict prevention is essential. Human development has focused mainly on engendering progress (with some notable exceptions such as concern to prevent soil degradation and climate change). Ensuring preparedness for most large-scale threats ranging from invasion to hyperinflation has been tacitly “outside the mandate” of human development. As Sen wrote, while the focal objective of human development has been “growth with equity,” human security seeks “downturn with security.” That is, policies for human security studiously foresee threats of whatever origin, and they seek to create the capacities required to prevent, mitigate, or cope with threats that would cut into people’s vital core. The agendas of environmental protection, AIDS prevention, famine prevention, social safety nets, and social security, form a key subset of human security concerns that overlap with “preventative” human development. But human security will likewise overtly emphasise protection from other critical and pervasive threats such as terrorism and new insecurities.

A third difference between human security and human development is their time horizon. In the case of human development, a considerable amount of effort is invested in institution-building, capacity-building, and otherwise making actions sustainable over time. In many cases human security would share this approach but some human security undertakings occur within very short time horizons and without participation. Emergency relief may be provided for internally displaced persons who are moving around on foot; relief camps may be set up to sustain flood victims for a few weeks and then disband; food for work programs may be provided until the drought – or the recession – has broken; peacekeepers may intervene to enforce a ceasefire. Clearly both human security and human development approaches address institution-building, as the discussions of early-warning systems for conflict prevention demonstrate. However some of the emergency relief work that human security entails (and no country is entirely immune from tornados or floods or earthquakes) is not included in the human development approach that works more towards durable change.

Thus the concepts of human security and human development differ in scope (HS narrower), in their preventative emphasis (HS relatively more), and in time horizon (HS may be relatively short). These differences are differences in emphasis, and go with a great deal of overlap in the areas previously discussed. But these differences do in turn affect the mixture of disciplines and institutions that are relevant to human security in comparison with human development.

5.3 Human Rights and Human Security

Human rights have become a widely accepted normative concept for international relations and foreign policy. The central characterising insight of human rights – that certain ‘rights’ inhere in human beings – is not recent. For example writings of Spanish Dominican Fray Francesco de Vitoria on the plight of American Indians under early 16th century colonial rule argued – against staunch opposition – that Indians and Spaniards were equally human beings: “characteristic differences [of custom and manner] in no way destroy or debilitate the essential unity of the human species ...” Yet Fray Vitoria further argued that certain practices such as cannibalism could be legitimately prevented or outlawed regardless of customary beliefs or current domestic laws. The universality and moral force of human rights were likewise argued by Hugo Grotius during Europe’s Thirty-Years War in the early 17th century and was embodied in France’s 1789 declaration on the rights of man. Other regions have other histories of human rights.

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122 The 1992 quincentennial celebrated Vitoria for founding international law on the natural rights and equality of all human persons, citing phrases such as this, published in the fourth seminar of the ‘Comisión Dominicana Permanente para la Celebración del Quinto Centenario del descubrimiento y Evangelización de America.’ Grandes Figuras de la Evangelización de América: Fray Francisco de Vitoria. Dominican Republic. 1992:7 and 8. For the original text see Pagden and Lawrance. 
123 Unfortunately his list of universal prohibitions did not include slavery, and did include not only the prohibition of murder, anthropophagy and human sacrifice, but also the prohibition of fornication, incest, theft, adultery, usury, sodomy, and perjury! 
Yet human rights have become considerably more powerful and uniformly acknowledged since World War two. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948, and began to sketch international human rights norms (see Table 2). Human rights norms have been further specified in many conventions (see Table 3). The overall effect of these human rights instruments has been to introduce and normalise human rights considerations in foreign policy. Whereas fifty years ago the accusation that a government was abusing human rights would hardly send a shiver down the aggressors’ spine, now even hitherto inaccessible leaders such as Pinotchet, Milosevic and Sankoh are being brought to trial. Notwithstanding objections from some who doubt the universality of human rights, public challenges to human rights more often address ‘which rights’ merit emphasis, and not whether concerns for human rights are ever applicable.125

But how do human rights and human security relate? How can they together more effectively marshal the attention and compassion of concerned agents? As has been discussed extensively earlier, human security and human rights are deeply interconnected in motivation and area of concern.

First and most evidently, part of the project of the human rights community has been to build consensus and public awareness around a set of universal and fundamental human rights that are argued to hold even when they are not in fact respected by state authorities or others. The thirty-eight human rights in Table 3, plus the additional conventions in Table 2, enable persons to pinpoint a perceived shortfall in justice, and also to argue that the ‘rights-violation’ is (and has been widely recognised as being) unacceptable. Human security likewise undertakes to address a set of rights or freedoms that it is unacceptable to ignore. While human security may be instrumentally useful to countries in other ways (see 5.1), one of the motivational forces for human security is that it addresses what most would consider to be the most basic and universal of human rights.

Second, human security and human rights address both violence and poverty; their subject matter is complex. The international bill of human rights includes basic needs such as work, education, food, self-determination, and healthcare. The same bill of human rights prohibits torture, slavery, persecution on religious or racial ground, and direct killing, and another Convention prohibits genocide. The identification protection and promotion of central facets of human lives from the ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ is the aim of human security as well as human rights.126

This seamless connection between the two aspects of human security is important because it has often been obscured in practice within the human rights community. For when the declaration was written into International Human Rights Covenants in 1966, cold war pressures necessitated a division between “first generation” civil and political rights (identified with the US and allies) and “second generation” economic social and cultural rights (which appealed to the USSR and allies). There were also third and fourth generation rights such as collective rights and the right to peace. The rift between types of rights went deep and reflected ideological priorities. The human rights community has, in the post cold war era, concentrated on mending this divide and re-uniting different generations of rights. Human security consolidates this position because it re-introduces the “indivisibility” of different kinds of human rights, organically. When the conceptual focus is on the human being, and when it is not burdened by problematic cold war history, both first and second generation rights naturally emerge as

125 Donnelly 1998.
fundamentally important. As one Japanese professor put it, human security “opens human rights in a fresh screen, and the problematic division is not there anymore.” Thus the distinction between human security and human rights does not lie in their motivation or subject matter.

A further relationship between human security and human rights concerns issues of duty or obligation. Different theories of human rights ground this obligation differently (and human rights have had only a limited effect precisely because no institution has the authority to enforce human rights obligations – although that is changing with the international criminal tribunals and the planned international criminal court). Yet governments and other institutions do, it is claimed, have a duty or obligation to respect human rights – whether these are perfect obligations or claim-rights between responsible actors, or imperfect obligations towards those who can help, which evoke their solidarity and common humanity. Human rights advocacy is a coherent undertaking precisely because any rights violation obliges others to act.

What kinds of obligations inhere in human security? On the face of it, the term “human security” might give the impression that it is not as tightly coupled with duties. This impression may have to do in part with the connotation of human security as an extension of national security that is, to some extent, voluntarily specified and undertaken by a concerned government. In contrast, the thrust of human rights is always on the correlative duties of other parties. But if human security is to provide a common platform for national and international and local groups to coordinate their efforts, then human security must also oblige: if the national government is dysfunctional and the local groups are in chaos, then some international group has the responsibility to protect the vital core of the population. In this sense, if human security concerns are “hitched onto the human rights vocabulary” they are enriched by the automatic sense of moral obligation. Thus to some extent human rights provides a more basic framework of universal obligations; human security refers quite pointedly to a certain cross-section of such obligations. If this is the case then the question becomes how human security is to moor onto the grander vehicle of human rights.

Of course this can also have a beneficial effect. The language of human rights, which was heavily coloured by ideological politics during the Cold War, still retains a residue of these colours to many policy-makers in government. Also, because of its institutional form in the legal community, the term human rights may communicate not a substantive moral message but a set of carefully specified and at times weak legal obligations. The language of human security is sometimes appealing because it can be used in social contexts where the language of human rights would meet entrenched opposition.

A final and not uncontroversial observation is needed regarding the indivisibility of human rights. The primary clear difference between human rights and human security is that human security explicitly recognises the need for ongoing prioritisation and discussion of elements of human security. Human rights activists will argue that each right is equally fundamental and indivisible, and that no institution can legitimately ‘pick and choose’. If human security initiatives were to implement that view, then the “elements of the vital core” would of necessity be the entire set of human rights for all nations everywhere. In contrast this paper has suggested that specifying human security does entail the explicit, open-ended prioritization of freedoms and rights that current human rights theories studiously avoid. While the disagreement about the ‘equal priority’ of all human rights may seem to drive the two approaches apart, it is actually quite helpful to have both approaches.

The human rights approach defends the incommensurable value of a list of human rights, which include freedom from torture and genocide, and the right for a woman to take paid leave after childbirth. The human security approach necessarily addresses concrete security threats and human rights threats individually or in smaller groupings. It recognises that some human rights conflict with one another, and that in real situation constraints of resources or political will
require hard choices between priorities within the set of human rights to be made. Both approaches usefully complement each other. And they may not be too terribly far apart. For example the several measures of human security mentioned in section three all identify a set of ‘co-realisable’ elements of human security and identify human security to be realised only when all elements are present above a certain threshold. That is, the concept of human security may, like human rights, entail that certain elements of human security are equally essential and equally fundamental. But the conception of human security defended here leaves the question open as to whether the elements of such a set are precisely the same as fundamental human rights, and how they differ over time and space. Probably the most significance divergences between human security and human rights are, however, not conceptual. The differences lie in the instruments and institutions that will implement human security. For example human rights activists generally have used legal instruments to prevent human rights abuses, or to punish transgressors; human security will use economic, political, and perhaps military forces and try to realise human security with the same force and decisiveness that characterises national security efforts. Evidently a gain for human security would be a gain for human rights and vice versa. The question is how the approaches can strengthen and complement one another.

Conclusion

This paper has, then, presented a working conception of human security in full awareness of the main competing definitions, characterizations, and complaints about human security in the literature (Section 3). It showed how the concept can be coherent, being based in practical reason, and argued that human security was best specified procedurally, so that it would be both appropriate and feasible. The definition retains many degrees of freedom. But concrete situations have far fewer. They are constrained by data sets, by political realities, by limited resources and by the needs for urgent action. Thus those who criticize human security of "vagueness" are requested to consider the practical instances of human security promotion by agencies, and even to enter the discussion of what human security priorities and responsibilities should be (Section 4). While human security is not an unfamiliar concept, and while it overlaps considerably with concepts that underlie systems of state security, human development and human rights protection, its distinctive emphases make a valuable contribution that the present altered security environment requires (Sections 2, 5). This being said, just as a set of criteria for judging a dramatic performance or an Olympic skating competition may be coherent and distinctive, the troubling decisions, the weighty balancing, the vexing value judgments, are encountered in the texture of real problems. Putting human security into practice entails facing into these challenges.
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Table 1: Selected Descriptions of Human Security

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<tr>
<th>Human Security in Major Reports of International Institutions</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Human Development Report</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>United Nations Development Program 1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>The UNDP 1994 Human Development Report articulated a universal, preventive, “people-centred” approach to human security that focused on “freedom from fear and freedom from want.” The Report defined human security as: 1) Safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and repression. 2) Protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in jobs, in homes or in communities.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Human Security Now 2003 Commission on Human Security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>The Commission on Human Security clarified the concept of human security while retaining its people-centred focus, and it's concentration on threats from both poverty and violence. • The Report defined the objective of human security as “to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment.” • Human security is realised by joint strategies of protection – crafting institutions that protect and advance human security – and empowerment – enabling people to act on their own behalf.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Millennium Report The United Nations Kofi A. Annan 2000</strong></td>
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<td>Human security in its broadest sense, embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential. Every step in this direction is also a step towards reducing poverty, achieving economic growth and preventing conflict. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human – and therefore national security.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Responsibility to Protect 2002 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Human security means the security of people – their physical safety, their economic and social well-being, respect for their dignity and worth as human beings, and the protection of their human rights and fundamental freedoms.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Today, security comprises two interrelated concepts: the state's role in protecting its borders from external threats and its role in ensuring ‘human security' for its citizens under the broader umbrella of human rights – meaning that every person is entitled to be freedom of oppression, violence, hunger, poverty, and disease and to live in an clean and healthy environment.</td>
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**Human Security in Nations and NGOs**

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<tr>
<th>Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs</th>
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<tr>
<td>Human Security is a people-centred approach to foreign policy which recognizes that lasting stability cannot be achieved until people are protected from violent threats to their rights, safety or lives.</td>
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<th>Global Environmental Change and Human Security Project</th>
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<td>Human security is achieved when and where individuals and communities • Have the options necessary to end, mitigate, or adapt to threats to their human, environmental, and social rights; • Actively participate in attaining these options; and • Have the capacity and freedom to exercise these options.</td>
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<th>Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1999</th>
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<tr>
<td>Human Security comprehensively covers all the menaces that threaten human survival, daily life and dignity… and strengthens efforts to confront these threats.</td>
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**Human Security in Current Literature**

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<th>Lloyd Axworthy 1999.</th>
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<td>Safety for people from both violent and non-violent threats.</td>
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<th>Fen Hampson et al. Madness in the Multitude 2002</th>
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<tr>
<td>The concept of ‘security’ can be defined as the absence of threat to core human values, including the most basic human value, the physical safety of the individual.” They identify core human values as physical security and the protection of basic liberties, economic needs and interests.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human security “is creeping around the edges of official thinking, suggesting that security be viewed as emerging from the conditions of daily life – food, shelter, employment, health, public safety – rather than flowing downward from a country’s foreign relations and military strength.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>The concept of human security is, in principle, quite broad. It takes the individual as the nexus of its concern, the life as lived, as the true lens through which we should view the political, economic and social environment. At its most basic level, human security means freedom from fear.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human security describes a condition of existence in which basic material needs are met and in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the community, can be met.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

128 2003:4 – this and following quotation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Some Proposed Elements of Human Security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNDP 1994</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Personal security</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Survival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

129 the right of individuals and communities to preservation of their life and health and to dwell in a safe and sustainable environment
130 access to employment and resources needed to maintain one’s existence, reduce scarcity, and improve the material quality of life in the community
131 freedom from discrimination based on gender, age, ethnicity or social status, with access to safety nets
132 the right to representation, autonomy (freedom), participation and dissent, this includes legal-judicial security
133 the psychological orientations of a society which enhance the ability to control uncertainty and fear
134 the right of individuals and communities to preserve their own life and health and to dwell in a safe and sustainable environment
135 access to employment and to the resources necessary to maintain one’s existence, with adequate measures taken to reduce maldistribution and artificial scarcity, and to permit improvements in the material quality of community life;
136 providing protection from discrimination based on age, gender, ethnicity or social status, combined with access to safety nets, knowledge and information as well as freedom to associate;
137 guaranteeing the right to representation, autonomy (freedom), participation and dissent, combined with empowerment to make choices and a reasonable probability of being able to effect change. This political dimension includes legal-judicial security: individual and collective access to justice and protection from abuse;
138 a social climate in which minority populations feel secure in expressing their cultural identity.
139 concerned with building international will and strengthening norms and capacity to reduce the human costs of armed conflict (hosted an International Conference on War Affected Children in 2000, actively supported developing strategies for assisting internally displaced persons, involved in human rights field operations and the campaign against the use of anti-personnel landmines, and supported the humanitarian intervention of NATO in Kosovo).
140 concerned with building UN capacities and addressing the demanding and increasingly complex requirements for deployment of skilled personnel, including Canadians, to these missions (improvements to Canadian deployment and training, acknowledging the increasing role that civilian police have to play and support for augmenting the UN’s recourse to an international police force to ensure basic law and order).
141 concerned with strengthening the capacity of the international community to prevent or resolve conflict, and building local indigenous capacity to manage conflict without violence (encouraging early warning systems, fact-finding missions, negotiation and mediation efforts for supporting formal and informal peace processes, improving sanctions targeting, working on small arms proliferation and post-conflict peacebuilding, evinced in places such as Bosnia, East Timor and Haiti).
142 concerned with fostering improved accountability of public and private sector institutions in terms of established norms of democracy and human rights (supports the establishment of an International Criminal Court to try those who violate international humanitarian law, encourage security sector reforms, work on combating corruption, increasing transparency and respecting freedom of opinion and expression, democratic governance and corporate social responsibility).
143 concerned with building international expertise, capacities and instruments to counter the growing threats posed by the rise of transnational organised crime (drugs and terrorism).
144 “at the most basic level, food, shelter, education and health care are essential for the survival of human beings.”
145 “incorporates personal autonomy, control over one’s life and unhindered participation in the life of the community.”
146 “Human security is oriented towards an active and substantial notion of democracy, one that ensures the opportunity for all for participation in the decisions that affect their lives. Therefore it is engaged directly with discussions of democracy at all levels, from the local to the global.”
Table 2:

**Human Rights Instruments (Picado 2001)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charter of the United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal Declaration of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles of International Co-operation in the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of the Country in which They Live</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration on Territorial Asylum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proclamation of Teheran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion or Belief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, Arbitrary and Summary Executions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration on the Promotion among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding between Peoples</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration on Social Progress and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration on the Use of Scientific and Technological Progress in the Interest of Peace and for the Benefit of Mankind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declaration on the Right to Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Internationally Recognized Human Rights

The international Bill of Human Rights recognizes the rights to:

- Equality of Rights without discrimination (D1, D2, E2, E3, C2, C3)
- Life (D3, C6)
- Liberty and security of person (D3, C9)
- Protection against slavery (D4, C8)
- Protection against torture and cruel and inhuman punishment (D5, C7)
- Recognition as a person before the law (D6, C16)
- Equal protection of the law (D7, C14, C26)
- Access to legal remedies for rights violations (D8, C2)
- Protection against arbitrary arrest or detention (D9, C9)
- Hearing before an independent and impartial judiciary (D10, C14)
- Presumption of innocence (D11, C14)
- Protection against ex post facto laws (D11, C15)
- Protection of privacy, family, and home (D12, C17)
- Freedom of movement and residence (D13, C12)
- Seek asylum from persecution (D14)
- Nationality (D15)
- Marry and found a family (D16, E10, C23)
- Own property (D17)
- Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (D18, C18)
- Freedom of opinion, expression, and the press (D19, C19)
- Freedom of assembly and association (D20, C21, C22)
- Political participation (D21, C25)
- Social Security (D22, E9)
- Work, under favourable conditions (D23, E6, E7)
- Free trade unions (D23, E8, C22)
- Rest and leisure (D24, E7)
- Food, clothing, and housing (D25, E11)
- Health care and social services (D25, E12)
- Special protections for children (D25, E10, C24)
- Education (D26, E13, E14)
- Participation in cultural life (D27, E15)
- A social and international order needed to realize rights (D28)
- Self-determination (E1, C1)
- Humane treatment when detained or imprisoned (C10)
- Protection against debtor’s prison (C11)
- Protection against arbitrary expulsion of aliens (C13)
- Protection against advocacy of rational or religious hatred (C20)
- Protection of minority culture (C27)

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\(^\text{1}\) 1994:23.
\(^\text{ii}\) 2002: 15.
\(^\text{iii}\) 2002: 4.
\(^\text{iv}\) Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, 1997:51.
\(^\text{v}\) 2000:xi

\(^{147}\) Reprinted exactly from Donnelly 1998:6. That chart specifies that the list “includes rights having a full article in a document on human rights, or being named in two of the three documents of the International Bill of HRs. The source of each right is indicated by parentheses, by document and article number. D = Universal Declaration of Human Rights. E = International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. C = International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”